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California Supreme Court Survey
October 1991-December 1991
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme cour, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and
judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
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I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Probation can be modfted for a nonwilful failure to pay
full restitution, when the payment schedule was based
upon the probationer's ability to pay: People v. Cookson.
In People v. Cookson,' the California Supreme Court determined
that California Penal Code section 1203.22 allows a modification of
probation when the defendant made a bona fide effort to pay restitu-
tion, but based upon his financial inability, failed to satisfy the re-
quired amount by the end of his original probation.3 The court held
that the trial court had jurisdiction to reexamine the terms of proba-
tion because financial inability constituted a change in circumstance. 4
Furthermore, the court held that while revocation of probation was
not allowed for a nonwillful failure to pay restitution, modification
was acceptable and permissible prior to the occurrence of an actual
violation.5 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the judgments of
the trial court and the court of appeal. 6
1. 54 Cal. 3d 1091, 820 P.2d 278, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Arabian, Baxter and George con-
curred. Justice Kennard joined Justice Moask in his dissenting opinion.
2. California Penal Code section 1203.2(a) states in pertinent part:
Tihe court may revoke and terminate such probation if the interests of jus-
tice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the
report of the probation officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of
the conditions of his or her probation, has become abandoned to improper as-
sociates or a vicious life, or has subsequently committed other offenses, re-
gardless whether he or she has been prosecuted for such offenses. However,
probation shall not be revoked for failure of a person to make restitution...
as a condition of probation unless the court determines that the defendant has
willfully failed to pay and has the ability to pay.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West Supp. 1991). Furthermore, California Penal Code
section 1203.2(b) states in pertinent part that "the court . .. may modify, revoke, or
terminate the probation of the probationer upon the grounds set forth in subdivision
(a) if the interests of justice so require." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(b) (West Supp.
1991). See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3477 (1985) (discussing the
court's ability to modify probation).
3. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1093-94, 820 P.2d at 280-81, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178. The
defendant, Cookson, was placed on three years' probation and required to pay the vic-
tim $12,000 in restitution. The probation officer based the monthly payments on the
defendant's ability to pay, first at $100 per month and then at $135 per month. After
the three-year period, Cookson had paid only a portion of the full restitution. There-
fore, the day before the scheduled end of probation, the probation officer requested an
extension of probation to guarantee further payment. Id For a general discussion of
the court's ability to order restitution payments to a victim, see 22 CAL. JuR. 3D Crimi-
nal Law § 3447 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
4. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1095, 820 P.2d at 281, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
5. Id. at 1097-98, 820 P.2d at 283, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.
6. Id. at 1100, 820 P.2d at 285, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183. The trial court granted an
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Initially, the supreme court stressed that a change in circumstance
was required before a court had jurisdiction to modify probation. 7
The supreme court explicitly determined that basing the payment
schedule on the defendant's ability to pay caused only a portion of
the restitution to be paid and, therefore, resulted in a change in cir-
cumstance.8 The court then disposed of the defendant's contention
that the court could neither revoke nor modify probation due to a
nonwillful failure to pay restitution.9 The court relied on Bearden v.
Georgia,O which held that while willful nonpayment justifies impris-
onment, nonwillful nonpayment requires other punishment." The
supreme court concluded that due to the similarity between Bearden
and California Penal Code section 1203.2(a), l2 the legislature in-
tended to codify Bearden and, consequently, an extension or other
modification is allowed for nonwillful failure to pay restitution.'3
Additionally, the court disposed of the defendant's claim that proba-
tion may be modified only when a violation occurs.' 4 Based on case
extension of two years and determined that the defendant's failure to pay the full
amount of restitution, notwithstanding his bona fide effort, constituted a violation of
the terms of probation. The court of appeal affirmed and concluded that California
Penal Code section 1203.2 allowed for a modification in this case. Id.
This is the first time the court has interpreted the application of California Penal
Code section 1203.2 to a nonwillful failure to pay restitution.
7. Id at 1095, 820 P.2d at 281, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179. See In re Clark, 51 Cal. 2d
838, 840, 337 P.2d 67, 68 (1959) ("An order modifying the terms of probation based
upon the same facts as the original order granting probation is in excess of the jurisdic-
tion of the court, for the reason that there is no factual basis to support it.") (citing In
re Bine, 47 Cal. 2d 814, 818, 306, P.2d 445, 447 (1957)). See generally 3 B. WITKIN & N.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crimes § 1643 (2d ed. 1989)
(stating that modification requires the appearance of new facts).
8. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1095, 820 P.2d at 281, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
The dissent argued that no change in circumstance occurred. Justice Mosk stressed
that the defendant's financial status was ascertainable at trial and the court's mere
failure to consider this is not a change in circumstance. Id at 1100, 820 P.2d at 285, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1095-96, 820 P.2d at 281, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179. The defendant relied on
People v. Ryan, 203 Cal. App. 3d 189, 249 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1988). In Ryan, the court
stated that "[t]he period of probation may not be extended for failure to make full res-
titution to the victim unless said failure is willful and the defendant has the ability to
pay." Id at 199, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
10. 461 U.S. 660 (1983). See generally David Hays, Comment, Constitutional
Law-Imprisoning Indigents for Failure to Pay Fine -Bearden v. Georgia, 30 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 111 (1985).
11. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668. The Court reasoned that "[t]o do otherwise would
deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of
his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary to the funda-
mental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 672-73 (citations
omitted).
12. See supra note 2 for statutory text.
13. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1097, 820 P.2d at 282, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 180. See gener-
ally 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 572 (1981 & Supp. 1991) (discussing restitution and
the defendant's ability to pay).
14. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1098, 820 P.2d at 283, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181. The defend-
ant relied on In re Stallings, 5 Cal. App. 3d 322, 85 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1970), where the court
1548
(Vol. 19: 1545, 1992] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
lawls and the language of Penal Code sections 1203.316 and
1203.2(b),'7 which both allow for modification and revocation prior to
a violation, the court determined that the defendant's claim was
without merit.' 8 Finally, the court rejected both the defendant's
equal protection and due process arguments because they were not
properly raised in the court of appeal.19
The supreme court has recognized the importance of restitution in
punishing and deterring future illegal activity as well as its benefit to
the overall rehabilitative process.20 Moreover, the court reaffirmed
the trial court's power to modify the terms of probation before an ac-
held that "[t]he trial court lacked the authority to extend the period of probation with-
out a finding that the petitioner had violated a condition of probation." Id. at 333, 85
Cal. Rptr. at 102 (citations omitted).
15. See In re Peeler, 266 Cal. App. 2d 483, 490, 72 Cal. Rptr. 254, 259-60 (1968)
(holding that neilher the relevant California Penal Code sections nor case law pre-
vents the court from modifying probation); People v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 356,
64 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (1967) (holding that a court has the authority to increase restitution
when new victims are discovered during the course of the original probation). See gen-
eraly 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crimes
§ 1694 (2d ed. 1989) (recognizing the court's broad power to impose new conditions).
16. California Penal Code section 1203.3 states in pertinent part, "The court shall
have authority at any time during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or change
its order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.3 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
17. See supra note 2 for statutory text.
18. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1098, 820 P.2d at 283, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181. The court,
therefore, disapproved of Stallings, 5 Cal. App. 3d 322, 85 Cal. Rptr. 96, to the extent
that is was inconsistent with this holding. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1100, 820 P.2d at 284,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182. The court also noted that its holding promotes the underlying
purposes of probation pronounced in California Penal Code section 1203.1:
The court may impose and require any or all of [the following] terms of im-
prisonment, fine, and conditions, and other reasonable condition, as it may de-
termine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that
amends may be made to society for the breach of the law . .. and generally
and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1991). See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 3442 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the terms and conditions of probation in
general); 3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for
Crimes § 1622 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the nature and purpose of
probation).
19. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1100, 820 P.2d at 284, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
20. Id. at 1097, 820 P.2d at 282-83, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 180-81. See People v. Richards
17 Cal. 3d 614, 620, 552 P.2d 97, 100-01, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540-41 (1976) (stating that
restitution "may serve the salutary purpose of making a criminal understand that he
has harmed not merely society in the abstract but also individual human beings, and
that he has a responsibility to make them whole"). See generally Douglas Laycock, Es-
say, The Scope and Signicance of Restitution, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1277 (1989); Thomas M.
Kelly, Note, %'here Offenders Pay for Their Crimes: Victim Restitution and its Con-
stitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685 (1984); and Note, Victim Restitution in the
Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARv. L. REV. 931 (1984).
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tual violation occurs.21 This should allow corrective measures to be
taken before a violation results in revocation of probation and incar-
ceration. Generally, the supreme court has given trial courts the
ability to fashion and reevaluate probationary schemes to best suit
each individual and the underlying goals of restitution.
CHAD JEFFERY FISCHER
II. DEATH PENALTY LAW
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing the
death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case approach, this
section focuses on the key issues under review by the
court and identifies trends and shifts in the court's
rationale
I. INTRODUCTION
Between July and December 1991, the California Supreme Court
rendered opinions in twelve death penalty cases.' By deciding only
twelve cases, however, the court did little to decrease its backlog of
automatic death penalty appeals.2 The Lucas court continued its tra-
21. Cookson, 54 Cal. 3d at 1098, 820 P.2d at 283, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.
1. This survey addresses the following cases, decided between July 11, 1991 and
December 31, 1991, listed alphabetically by defendants: People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d
932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (1991), petition for cert filed (U.S. May 26, 1992)
(No. 91-8387); People v. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th 103, 820 P.2d 559, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335
(1991), petition for cert filed (U.S. May 29, 1992) (No. 91-8445); People v. Breaux, 1
Cal. 4th 281, 821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (1991), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June
25, 1992) (No. 92-5007); People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
696 (1991), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 21, 1992) (No. 91-8405); People v. Fierro, 1
Cal. 4th 173, 821 P.2d 1302, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (1991), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June
18, 1992) (No. 91-8714); People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d 707, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75
(1991); People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1991), petition
for cert filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3816 (U.S. May 19, 1992) (No. 91-1860); People v. Mickle, 54
Cal. 3d 140, 814 P.2d 290, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1679 (1992);
People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 817 P.2d 893, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3040 (1992); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 821 P.2d 610, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106
(1991), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 15, 1992) (No. 91-8611); People v. Sully, 53 Cal.
3d 1195, 812 P.2d 163, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1494 (1992); Peo-
ple v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411, 814 P.2d 1273, 285 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1772 (1992) [hereinafter, subsequent histories will be omitted].
2. Every year, between 35 and 40 new death penalty verdicts are appealed to the
supreme court. Currently, it takes approximately six years for a death penalty verdict
to reach the supreme court. Philip Hager, Justices Will Recruit Death Row Lawyers;
Counsel" State High Court Takes Over Job to Break Backlog of Inmates Wrho Need At-
torneys for Their Appeals, L.A. Times, Mar. 26, 1992, at A3.
For a discussion of the automatic appeals since 1989 see Christina Katris, Kurt M.
Langkow, & Arthur S. Moreau III, California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty
Law - Survey VII, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 787 (1992); Denise R. Harrington, California
Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law - Survey VI, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1138
(1991); Cori L. MacDonneil, California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law
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dition of affirming death penalty cases, finding very few errors, and
using the harmless error doctrine extensively. 3 During this time pe-
riod, the court reversed the death penalty only once. 4
In People v. Edwards,5 the California Supreme Court reconsidered
the admissibility of victim impact evidence in light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee,6 which held
that a state's admission of such evidence in a capital case does not vi-
olate the Eighth Amendment. 7 This topic is discussed in greater de-
tail in section V(D).8
The defendants in the cases surveyed made a variety of creative ar-
guments. Recognizing the seriousness of its task, the supreme court
scrutinized each contention. As a result, the surveyed cases, like
most death penalty cases, tend to be long and tedious. This survey
provides a concise review and analysis of the most prevalent and im-
portant issues raised on appeal. For ease of understanding and quick
reference, this survey is divided into the following sections: Jury Is-
sues, 9 Guilty Phase Issues,10 Special Circumstances Issues," and Pen-
alty Phase Issues.'2
- Survey V, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 716 (1991); Stathy Panopolous & Robert J. Mills, Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law - Survey IV, 17 PEPP. L. REV.
1095 (1990); James D. McGinley, California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty
Law - Survey II, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 537 (1990); John A. Mayers & Susan S. Seemiller,
California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law - Survey II, 16 PEPP. L.
REV. 1165 (1989); Howard S. Fallman & Charles Eskridge, III, California Supreme
Court Survey - Death Penalty Law - Survey 1, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 451 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Death Penalty Law VII, VI, V, IV, III, II, I, respectively].
3. Under the harmless error doctrine, the court focuses "on the underlying fair-
ness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error."
People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 47, 753 P.2d 1, 11, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 220 (1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 954 (1988). See generally 9 B. Witkin, CALIFORNIA PROcEDURE, Appeal
§ 324 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992) (discussing harmless error); 6 B. WITKIN & N. EP-
STEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Reversible Error §§ 3279-3280 (2d ed. 1989) (exam-
ining the history of harmless error).
4. People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d 707, 818 P.2d 75, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1991). See
infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the error requiring rever-
sal. This continues the court's high rate of affirmance; in the 50 cases the supreme
court has considered since mid-1990 it has upheld the death sentences in 48. State
High Court Limit? Judges on Death Sentences; Justices Deny Review in Case Revers-
ing Judge Schatz, THE RECORDER, Mar. 27, 1992, at 1.
5. 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991).
6. 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991).
7. Id. at 2609.
8. See infra notes 128-160 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 13-41 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 42-87 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
12. See inkfra notes 97-196 and accompanying text.
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II. JURY ISSUES
Seven of the twelve cases alleged errors concerning jury selection
and composition, raising issues of Wheeler and Witherspoon-Witt er-
ror, as well as other miscellaneous contentions.'3 The court reversed
one case on Wheeler error,14 but otherwise found no error, harmless
error, or that the defendant had waived his claim.15
A. Wheeler Error
The Wheeler court held that peremptory challenges used to ex-
clude jurors belonging to an identifiable group (racial, religious, eth-
nic, or similar) based on a presumed group bias is an unconstitutional
deprivation of a defendant's right to "trial by jury drawn from a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community."'16 Once a moving party
makes a timely objection and establishes a prima facie showing that
an opponent has used peremptory challenges for a discriminatory
purpose,' 7 the burden shifts to the opposing party to present a neu-
tral explanation.' 8 Thereafter, the trial court has an obligation to
make a sincere and reasoned attempt to discern whether the prof-
fered reasons for exclusion are genuine.' 9
Of the twelve cases surveyed, the only reversal occurred in People
v. Fuentes.20 In Fuentes, the supreme court held that the trial court
did not satisfy its Wheeler obligation to evaluate the prosecutor's
proffered race-neutral reasons for excluding potential black jurors.21
Specifically, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged nineteen poten-
tial jurors, fourteen of whom were black.22 When voir dire con-
cluded, the trial judge instructed the prosecutor to justify his
challenges of black jurors.23 The supreme court reasoned that by so
13. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (1991); Peo-
ple v. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (1991); People v. Edwards,
54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991); People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d
707, 583 P.2d 75, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1991); People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 818 P.2d 84,
286 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1991); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 817 P.2d 893, 286 Cal. Rptr.
628 (1991); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 821 P.2d 610, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (1991).
14. Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d 707, 583 P.2d 75, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792. See irfra notes 20-28.
15. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
16. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 903 (1978). See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
17. To establish a prima facie case, the moving party must fulfill three require-
ments: (1) produce a complete record of the circumstances during voir dire; (2) estab-
lish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group; and (3) show a
strong likelihood that the persons are being excluded because of group association.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
18. Id at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
19. People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d 707, 718, 818 P.2d 75, 81, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 798.
20. 54 Cal. 3d 707, 818 P.2d 75, 286 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1991).
21. Id at 718, 818 P.2d at 81, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
22. Id at 711, 818 P.2d at 76-77, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
23. Id at 715, 818 P.2d at 79, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
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instructing, the trial judge had implicitly found a prima facie case of
improper exclusion on the basis of race.24
Upon demand, the prosecutor offered several reasons for his exclu-
sion of black jurors. Although the trial court made some effort to re-
view the prosecutor's reasons, it failed to ascertain the particular
reasons for excluding each challenged juror.25 Instead, the trial court
observed that although some of the proffered reasons were "very
spurious," three acceptable challenges prompted exclusion.26 The
supreme court disagreed with this abstract, non-individualized
method of review, holding that a "truly 'reasoned attempt' to evalu-
ate the prosecutor's explanations requires the court to address the
challenged jurors individually to determine whether any one of
them had been. improperly excluded."27 Failing to conduct individual
inquiries as to the validity of each particular challenge, the trial court
denied the defendant his right to a jury drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community; hence, the death penalty was
reversed.28
Several other defendants alleged a deprivation of their right to a
representative jury.29 However, because their claims were not based
on Wheeler error, they will be discussed in section II(C), infra.30
B. Witherspoon-Witt Error
Witherspoon-Witt error occurs when a court dismisses a juror be-
cause of his or her objections to the death penalty without a finding
that the juror could not impartially apply the law.3 1 Four cases al-
24. Id at 716, 818 P.2d at 79, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 796. When the trial court inquires
about the prosecutor's justifications, the court has made at least an implied finding of a
prima facie showing. Id at 716, 818 P.2d at 80, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 797 (citing People v.
Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 767 P.2d 1047, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1989)).
25. Id at 718, 818 P.2d at 81, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
26. Id at 720, 818 P.2d at 82, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
27. Id at 720, 818 P.2d at 82-83, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800 (emphasis added).
28. Id at 721, 818 P.2d at 83, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
29. People v. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (1991); People
v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 817 P.2d 893, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1991).
30. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
31. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1985). Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968), held that excluding a juror who voices objections to the death penalty
does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury if the juror
makes it unmistakably clear that he would "automatically vote against the imposition
of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the
trial." Id. at 522 n.21. Witt eased the standard by holding that a juror could properly
be excluded if the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the perform-
ance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Witt,
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leged Witherspoon-Witt error and the court rejected the claim in
each case.3 2 The court found that the challenged jurors held views
that would prevent or substantially impair their performance as ju-
rors; thus, they were properly excused.3 3
C. Miscellaneous Jury Issues
In six cases, the defendants raised jury issues other than Wheeler
or Witherspoon-Witt error.34 Alleged trial court errors included the
following: Denial of separate guilt and penalty phase juries, 35 excusal
469 U.S. at 424. The California Supreme Court adopted the Witherspoon-Witt stan-
dard in People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 767, 739 P.2d 1250, 1268, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 100
(1987).
See generally Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End Death-
Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CrIM. L. REV. 1 (1986); Barbara J. Whisler, Sixth
Amendment-Death Qualtfication of the Jury: Process Is Permissible Where Defend-
ant Does Not Face Death Penalty: Buchanon v. Kentucky, 78 CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
954 (1988); James M. Carr, Note, At Witt's End- The Continuing Quandary of Jury
Selection in Capital Cases, 39 STAN. L. REV. 427 (1987).
32. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (1991);
Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81; People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612,
818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1991); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 821 P.2d 610, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (1991).
33. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 964, 820 P.2d at 229-30, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127-28. Pro-
spective juror Sullivan stated that because of his feelings about the death penalty, he
would apply a standard of guilt higher than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 964, 820
P.2d at 229, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127. Prospective juror Griffin stated that "[mly decision
is not going to be the death penalty." Id Prospective juror Van Giesen stated that she
would not be responsible for taking another's life. Id In Breaux, all three excluded
jurors stated that they did not think they could vote for the death penalty. Breaux, 1
Cal. 4th at 97 n.8, 820 P.2d at 601 n.8, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310 n.8.
In Mickey, each excluded juror made it unmistakably clear that they would not vote
for the death penalty. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 680, 818 P.2d at 119, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
In Price, an excluded witness stated that she would be unable to vote for the death
penalty even if the evidence indicated it was the proper punishment. Price, 1 Cal. 4th
at 402, 821 P.2d at 651, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
34. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112; Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281,
821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81; People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 696 (1991); Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801; People v.
Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 817 P.2d 893, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1991); Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324,
821 P.2d 610, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106.
35. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 571, 817 P.2d at 902, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 637; Mickey, 54
Cal. 3d at 662, 818 P.2d at 107, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 824. California Penal Codes section
190.4(c) states:
If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may
be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider.., the
truth of any special circumstances which may be alleged, and the penalty to
be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in
which case a new jury shall be drawn. The court shall state facts in support of
the finding of good cause upon the record and cause them to be entered into
the minutes.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
In Nicolaus, the defendant argued that the trial court deprived him of his constitu-
tional right to a representative jury by refusing to impanel separate guilt and penalty
phase juries. The supreme court held that because the defendant did not show "good
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of jurors for personal hardship,36 excusal of jurors for financial hard-
ship,37 denial of motion to quash the jury venire, 38 refusal to exclude
jurors because of their views favoring capital punishment,39 and lim-
cause" for deviating from the clear legislative mandate of section 190.4(c), there was no
error. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 573-74, 817 P.2d at 904, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
In Mickey, the defendant argued that because the prosecutor excluded "guilt phase
includables" (those persons who would automatically vote against the death penalty at
the penalty phase, but who could be fair and impartial at the guilt phase, Hovey v. Su-
perior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 17 n.36, 616 P.2d 1301, 1308 n.36, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 135 n.36
(1980)), the prosecution was required to impanel a new penalty phase jury. The court
had rejected such an argument in Hovey/, and accordingly found no deprivation of the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 663, 818 P.2d at
107-08, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25.
The Ashmus court also addressed the question of "guilt phase includables." There,
the court held that exclusion of "guilt phase includables" does not offend the right to a
representative jury under either the United States or California Constitution.
Ashmu8, 54 Cal. 3d at 956-57, 820 P.2d at 224, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 123 (citing People v.
Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1983); People v. Guzman, 45 Cal.
3d 915, 755 P.2d 917, 248 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988)). See also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986).
36. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 663, 818 P.2d at 108, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 825. The court held
that the claim was waived, and in any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by excusing jurors for undue personal hardship. Accordingly, the defendant's right to
a representative jury was not violated. Id. at 664-65, 818 P.2d at 109, 286 Cal. Rptr. at
826. See also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 204(b) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that "[a]n eligi-
ble person may be excused from jury service only for an undue hardship").
37. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 571, 817 P.2d at 902, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (holding that
excluding jurors because of financial hardship did not violate the defendant's right to a
jury selected from a representative cross section of society and that poor people do not
constitute an identifiable class that, if excluded, would violate the defendant's rights).
38. In Breaux, the defendant moved to quash the jury venire because of under-
representation of Hispanics. He contended that the trial court's denial of his motion
deprived him of his right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of
the community, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. In order to establish a prima
facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that
the group allegedly excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that
this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selec-
tion process. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th at 297, 821 P.2d at 592, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89 (citing
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). The court held that defendant failed to
satisfy the third requirement because he presented no evidence as to the cause of a
statistical disparity in Hispanic representation. Id. at 298, 821 P.2d at 592, 3 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 89.
39. In Ashmus, the court held that by not exhausting his peremptory challenges at
trial, the defendant did not preserve the claim of error. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 964, 820
P.2d at 230, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138 (citing People v. Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d 749, 770, 759
P.2d 1260, 1273, 251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 96 (1988) (holding that in order to preserve a claim of
error relating to the denial of a challenge for cause, the defendant must usually ex-
haust his peremptory challenges)).
In People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 821 P.2d 610, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (1991), the court
rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by denying challenges to de-
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iting defendants' examination of potential jurors during voir dire.40
In each case, the court found either that the claim was waived or
there was no error.4 1
III. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
A. Miranda Issues
In six of the surveyed cases,4 2 the defendants asserted claims based
upon violations of Miranda v. Arizona.43 In each instance, the court
found that the defendants had knowingly and voluntarily waived
their rights," or that the statements were not made during a custo-
dial interrogation. 4 5
fense jurors. The court found that the defendant could not have been prejudiced be-
cause the defense had sufficient peremptory challenges remaining to remove each of
the jurors unsuccessfully challenged for cause. Id. at 401, 821 P.2d at 651, 3 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 147 (citing People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 184, 807 P.2d 949, 965, 279 Cal. Rptr.
720, 736 (1991)).
In Mickey, the trial court denied the defendant's challenge of prospective juror Pe-
rez. The supreme court assumed error but reasoned that any such error was harmless
because Perez did not sit on the jury. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 818 P.2d at 121, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 838.
In People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991), the
supreme court found no prejudicial error when the trial court denied eleven defense
challenges for cause. Furthermore the court reasoned that any potential error would
have been harmless because none of the eleven prospective jurors sat on the jury, and
the defendant had ten peremptories left when the final jury was impaneled. Id. at 830,
819 P.2d at 463, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723.
40. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 959, 820 P.2d at 226, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124 (holding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting voir dire).
41. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
42. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112; Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281,
821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81; Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
696; Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801; People v. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d
140, 814 P.2d 290, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1991); People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 812 P.2d
163, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1991).
43. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When people are placed in custody, Miranda requires that
the police inform them that (1) they have a right to remain silent, (2) anything they
say can be used against them in a court of law, (3) they have the right to an attorney,
and (4) if they cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for them. Id. at 487-88
n.57. See generally 5 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CAUIFORNIA CMINAL LAW, Trial
§ 2679 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992).
44. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 968, 820 P.2d at 232, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 130 (holding that
the defendant's statement was properly admitted because he had waived his Miranda
rights); Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th at 299-301, 821 P.2d at 594-95, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90-91 (stating
that the defendant's morphine injections at the hospital did not prohibit a knowing
and voluntary waiver); Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d at 169-71, 814 P.2d at 304-05, 284 Cal. Rptr. at
525-26 (reasoning that the defendant's single waiver was sufficient for four interviews
because there was no change in circumstances requiring readvisement of his Miranda
rights); Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1232-34, 812 P.2d at 185-86, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (noting that
on two separate occasions, Sully, an ex-police officer, waived his Miranda rights and
proceeded to answer questions; hence, no error or harmless error was found).
45. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 814-15, 819 P.2d at 452-54, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712-14 (rea-
soning that there was no custodial interrogation when Edwards spontaneously volun-
teered a confession to a police officer); Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 641-53, 818 P.2d at 93-101,
286 Cal. Rptr. at 810-18 (finding that several voluntary statements made by the accused
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B. Evidentiary Issues
In three of the cases, the defendants argued that the verdict was
not supported by sufficient evidence.46 The court, however, rejected
the claim each time.47 The defendants also raised a variety of other
evidentiary objections, including improper introduction of prior of-
fenses, 48 introduction of privileged communications, 49 introduction of
the defendant's hostility towards religion,50 improper admission of
during transportation from Japan to the United States were not made while under cus-
todial interrogation).
46. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696; People v. Nicolaus,
54 Cal. 3d 551, 81-7 P.2d 893, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1991); People v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411,
814 P.2d 1273, 285 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1991). "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
[the reviewing court] must draw all inferences in support of the verdict that can rea-
sonably be deduced and must uphold the judgment if, after viewing all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 813, 819
P.2d at 452, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712 (citing People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 86, 744 P.2d
1127, 1144, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 611 (1987)). See generally B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRMI-
NAL PROCEDURE APPEAL §§ 683-685 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal
Law §§ 3248-3268 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
47. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 813-14, 819 P.2d at 452, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712 (evidence
sufficient to support finding of premeditation and deliberation); Nicolaua, 54 Cal. 3d at
575-77, 817 P.2d at 905-06, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41 (same); Webster, 54 Cal. 3d at 439-40,
814 P.2d at 1288, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (evidence of robbery sufficient to support special
circumstance of murder during commission of robbery). In Webster the court stated
that the "1i]mmediate presence" element of robbery is satisfied if the stolen property is
within the victim's reach, inspection, observation, or control, such that she could, if not
overcome by violence or fear, retain her possession of it. Id. Even though the car was
several hundred feet away, the court held that it was stolen from the victim's "imme-
diate presence." Id.
48. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d at 171-73, 814 P.2d at 305-07, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28 (stating
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the defendant's prior fel-
ony conviction for impeachment purposes); Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1224-26, 812 P.2d at 179-
81, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61 (finding admission of prior crimes evidence was either not
error or harmless); Webster, 54 Cal. 3d at 445, 814 P.2d at 1292, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (no
error).
49. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 654-55, 818 P.2d at 102-03, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20. The
supreme court reasoned in Mickey that the trial court properly admitted letters that
the defendant had sent to his wife because the defendant did not intend non-disclo-
sure. See People v. Gomez, 134 Cal. App. 3d 874, 185 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1982). Nor did the
defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See North v. Superior Court, 8
Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972). The defendant believed that Japa-
nese and/or U.S. officials intercepted and read his mail; thus the marital communica-
tions privilege did not apply. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 654-55, 818 P.2d at 102-03, 286 Cal.
Rptr. at 819-20.
50. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 577-78, 817 P.2d at 906-07, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42 (rea-
soning that evidence of the defendant's hostility towards religion was relevant to show
motive because the victim was very involved with her church and the defendant had
written about his "war against Christianity"). The supreme court also concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the evidence more probative than
prejudicial. Id.
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photographs,S1 Kelly-Frye error,52 and search and seizure errors.53 In
each case, the court found no error, harmless error, or that the claim
was waived.54
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
In general, prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the prosecutor
employs deceptive methods to persuade the court or the jury.5 5 In
seven of the cases surveyed,56 defendants alleged misconduct during
51. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 973-74, 820 P.2d 214, 236, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112,
134 (1991) (reasoning that the photographs of the victim were relevant to show malice
and not unduly prejudicial; hence, no error); People v. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173, 222-23,
821 P.2d 1302, 1324, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 448 (1991) (stating that photographs of the vic-
tim's body were properly admitted because they were relevant and not unduly prejudi-
cial); Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 655-56, 818 P.2d at 103, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (same).
52. The Kelly-Frye rule defines the required foundation for admitting expert testi-
mony on the application of a new scientific technique. The admissibility of such evi-
dence requires (1) testimony by a person who is properly qualified as an expert on the
subject as to the general acceptance of the scientific technique, and (2) testimony as to
the use of correct scientific procedures in the particular case. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at
970, 820 P.2d at 234, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 132 (citing People v. Kelly 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549
P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923)).
In Ashmua, the court found no Kelly-Frye error because the People showed that
electrophoretic analysis of dried semen stains was generally accepted by the scientific
community and that correct scientific procedures were used in this case. Id. at 971, 820
P.2d at 235, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133. The high court also upheld the trial court's admis-
sion of an expert's electrophoretic analysis of dried bloodstains in Fierro because the
scientific community accepted such procedure, see People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 807
P.2d 949, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1991), and the scientist used correct scientific procedures
when analyzing the blood. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th at 214-15, 821 P.2d at 442-43, 3 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 1318-19.
53. People v. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th 103, 122-23, 820 P.2d 559, 567, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
335, 343 (1991) (reasoning that exigent circumstances validated the warrantless arrest
because the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant was the killer, and
there was a strong likelihood that the defendant would flee the country; therefore, evi-
dence seized pursuant to the arrest was admissible); Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th at 217, 821 P.2d
at 1320, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444 (reasoning that warrantless search of a purse was valid
because the owner consented); Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 574-75, 817 P.2d at 904-05, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 639-40 (finding that evidence was properly admitted because it was ob-
tained pursuant to a valid search warrant; finding the officer justified in reading let-
ters that in plain view); People v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411, 431, 814 P.2d 1273, 1282, 285
Cal. Rptr. 31, 40 (1991) (holding seizure of wallet in plain view valid).
54. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. See also People v. Price, 1 Cal.
4th 324, 433-41, 821 P.2d 610, 672-78, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 168-74 (1991). In Price, the
defendant raised numerous evidentiary objections, but in each instance the court found
either no error or that any error was harmless. The court noted that in such a lengthy
trial, errors are bound to occur, but an error must be prejudicial to warrant reversal.
Id.
55. Id. at 447, 821 P.2d at 682, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178. "[T]he defendant need not
show that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or with appreciation for the wrongfulness
of the conduct, nor is a claim of prosecutorial misconduct defeated by a showing of a
prosecutor's subjective good faith." Id. (citing People v. Bolton, 23 Cal. 3d 208, 214, 589
P.2d 396, 398-99, 152 Cal. Rptr. 141, 143-44 (1979)).
56. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 975-76, 820 P.2d at 237-38, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 135-36; Baci-
galupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 130, 820 P.2d at 572, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348; People v. Breaux, 1 Cal.
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jury selection,57 opening remarks, 8 presentation of evidence,59 and
closing arguments.6O In every instance the court found in favor of
the People, determining either that the defendant did not suffer prej-
udice, or that the defendant had waived his claim.6 1
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Three of the twelve cases surveyed involved ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.62 According to People v. Marsden,6 3 the trial court
must give the defendant every opportunity to fully explain his rea-
sons for wanting substitute counsel64 Additionally, pursuant to
4th 281, 305-06, 821 P.2d 585, 597-98, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 93-94 (1991); Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th at
207-13, 821 P.2d at 1313-18, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437-42; People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612,
667, 818 P.2d 84, 110-11, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 827-28 (1991); Price, 1 Cal. 4th at 447-62, 821
P.2d at 682-92, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178-88; People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 1234-35, 812
P.2d 163, 186-87, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 167-68 (1991). See also inmra notes 161-162 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase.
57. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th at 207-10, 821 P.2d at 1313-15, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437-39 (stat-
ing that the defendant waived objection to various comments regarding adversarial
process and the right to remain silent, or error was non-prejudicial); Price, 1 Cal. 4th
at 447-51, 821 P.2d at 682-84, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178-80 (finding that the defense coun-
sel's statements suggesting improper motives were not prejudicial).
58. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 667, 818 P.2d at 110-11, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28 (reasoning
that the defendant waived, for lack of timeliness, any objection to the prosecutor's
opening remarks about a witness that did not actually testify).
59. Price, 1 Cal. 4th at 451-60, 821 P.2d at 684-91, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 180-87 (finding
harmless the prosecutor's alleged misconduct, including numerous comments during
the lengthy trial regarding the character of the defendant and defense counsel that re-
vealed inadmissabie evidence).
60. E.g., Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1235-36, 812 P.2d at 186-87, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68. In
all seven of the cases, the defendants alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing
arguments, ranging from commenting on the credibility of witnesses to arguing facts
outside the record. For a complete list of cases that alleged prosecutorial misconduct
see supra note 56.
61. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. Generally, "[t]o preserve for ap-
peal a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defense must make a timely objection at
trial and request an admonition; otherwise, the point is reviewable only if an admoni-
tion would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct." Price, 1 Cal. 4th at
447, 821 P.2d at 682, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178 (citing People v. Wharton 53 Cal. 3d 522, 591,
809 P.2d 290, 333, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 674 (1991)).
62. People v. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 306-07, 821 P.2d 585, 599, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 95
(1991); People v. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173, 204-07, 821 P.2d 1302, 1311-13, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
426, 435-37 (1991); People v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411, 432-36, 814 P.2d 1273, 1283-86, 285
Cal. Rptr. 31, 41-44 (1991).
63. 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).
64. Id at 124, 465 P.2d at 48, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 160. See generally RONALD M.
GEORGE, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL TRIAL JuDGES' BENCHBOOK at 48.4-.5 (1988) (noting
that a judge's refusal to appoint substitute defense counsel without allowing the de-
fendant an opportunity to "relate specific grounds" for substitution is reversible error);
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Trial § 368 (1963 & Supp. 1985).
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Faretta v. California,65 a defendant may waive his right to counsel
and proceed pro se, provided his waiver is knowing and voluntary.66
Two defendants asserted that the trial court improperly considered
their requests for substitute counsel6 7 and one defendant claimed er-
ror based on Faretta.68 The supreme court decided both of these is-
sues in favor of the People.69
E. Instructional Error
In eight of the twelve cases reviewed, the defendants advanced a
variety of guilt phase instructional errors.70 The defendants alleged
that the trial court gave erroneous instructions on the following is-
sues: consciousness of guilt,71 accomplice,72 lesser-included offenses,7 3
65. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
66. cL at 819-21.
67. In People v. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173, 821 P.2d 1302, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (1991), the
defendant stated that he did not "trust" counsel and that he was not "comfortable"
with counsel. Id. at 205-06, 821 P.2d at 1312-13, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 436-37. After three
separate in camera hearings, the trial court properly determined that these general
statements were not sufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 204-07,
821 P.2d at 1311-13, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435-37.
In People v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411, 814 P.2d 1273, 285 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1991), the de-
fendant claimed that appointed counsel improperly handled pretrial writs. The trial
court considered the defendant's claims, but determined there was no indication that
the appointed attorney substantially impaired the defendant's right to effective assist-
ance; thus, replacement was not necessary. Id. at 434-36, 814 P.2d at 1284-86, 285 Cal.
Rptr. at 42-44 (1991).
68. In Webster, the defendant never hinted that he wished to proceed without
counsel and the trial court was under no sua sponte duty to question the defendant's
silence. Webster at 432-36, 814 P.2d at 1283-86, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 41-44. Furthermore,
the defendant was not entitled to a mistrial when the court appointed new counsel for
the penalty phase because deprivation of effective assistance only occurs when defense
counsel is replaced exclusively for closing arguments. Id at 454-55, 814 P.2d at 1298-99,
285 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
69. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
70. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (1991); Peo-
ple v. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th 103, 820 P.2d 559, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (1991); People v.
Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (1991); People v. Mickey, 54 Cal.
3d 612, 818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1991); People v. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d 140, 814 P.2d
290, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1991); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 817 P.2d 893, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 628 (1991); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 821 P.2d 610, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (1991);
People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 812 P.2d 163, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1991).
71. In Ashmus the judge instructed the jury as follows:
If you find that before this trial the defendant made willfully false or deliber-
ately misleading statements concerning the charge upon which he is now be-
ing tried, you may consider such statements as a circumstance tending to
prove consciousness of guilt but i(t] i[s] not suffic[i]ent of itself to prove guilt.
The weight to be given to such a circumstance and its significance, if any, are
matters for your determination.
Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 976-77, 820 P.2d at 238, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136. The supreme court
conceded that this instruction "defines a permissive inference-to the effect that if the
defendant lied about the crime, it may be inferred that he himself believed he was re-
sponsible therefore." Id at 977, 820 P.2d at 238, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136. However, the
supreme court determined that any error was harmless because "'[a] permissive infer-
ence violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that
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flight,74 admission by defendant,75 defendant's failure to testify,76 tes-
timony of an informer,7 7 diminished capacity,78 attempt,79 and immu-
reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury."' Id at
977, 820 P.2d at 238, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,
314-15 (1985)).
In Breaux, the court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.06
which allow the jury to determine what significance, if any, to place on evidence of
consciousness of guilt. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th at 303-04, 821 P.2d at 597, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
93. See CALJIC Nos. 2.03 & 2.06 (5th ed. 1988). The supreme court determined that
the two instructions properly informed the jury about consciousness of guilt and that
the instructions did not address the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime.
Therefore, no error occurred. Id at 303-05, 821 P.2d at 597, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93.
In Mickey, the trial judge instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.03, which
states: "If you find that before this trial the defendant made false or deliberately mis-
leading statements." Miccey, 54 Cal. 3d at 671, 818 P.2d at 114, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 831
(emphasis added). The supreme court determined that inserting the word "wilfully"
before "false" would make the instruction more accurate by excluding from considera-
tion mistaken remarks, but that in this case a reasonable juror could not have miscon-
strued the instruction. Id
72. Price, 1 Cal. 4th at 443, 821 P.2d at 679, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175 (finding the in-
struction defining an accomplice was proper); Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1227, 812 P.2d at 181,
283 Cal. Rptr. at 162 (failing to give the accomplice instruction about a witness did not
prejudice the defendant).
73. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 127, 820 P.2d at 570, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346 (finding no
proof in the record that would require the judge, sua sponte, to give an instruction on a
lesser-included offense); Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 672-73, 818 P.2d at 114-15, 286 Cal. Rptr.
at 831-32 (holding that the standard instruction on lesser-included offenses does not vi-
olate the federal or state constitution); Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 580, 817 P.2d at 908, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 643 (holding that the standard jury instruction does not lead to error);
Price, 1 Cal. 4th at 464, 821 P.2d at 693-94, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189-90 (reasoning that the
trial court's failure to give an instruction on manslaughter was harmless error because
the jury found the defendant guilty of felonious murder based on special
circumstances).
74. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 127-28, 820 P.2d at 570-71, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346-47
(finding no error because the instruction regarding flight was neither argumentative
nor biased); Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 578-80, 817 P.2d at 907-08, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43
(reasoning that no prejudice occurred because the standard instruction regarding flight
does not "permit the jury to draw irrational and irrelevant inferences about [the de-
fendant's] state of mind at the time of the crime").
75. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 128-29, 820 P.2d at 571, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347 (finding
no error because the instruction did not order the jury to mistrust the defendant's
statements).
76. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 673-74, 818 P.2d at 115, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (holding that
the standard instruction concerning a defendant's failure to testify does not lead to an
improper or inadequate understanding of the pertinent law by a reasonable juror).
77. Id at 674-75, 818 P.2d at 115-16, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33 (holding that the trial
court's failure to instruct on informant testimony, without a formal request, was not
error).
78. Id at 675-77, 818 P.2d at 116-17, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34 (holding that failure to
instruct on diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication was erroneous, but that er-
rors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
79. People v. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d 140, 174-75, 814 P.2d 290, 308, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511,
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nity.80 The court resolved all instructional issues in favor of the
People, finding either no error or harmless error.8l
F. Miscellaneous Guilt Phase Issues
Although the court confronted several other alleged guilt phase er-
rors, this section examines only the most prominent. In three
cases,8 2 the defendants alleged that the trial court erroneously denied
motions for change of venue.8 3 In four cases, the defendants claimed
that their absence from the proceedings constituted prejudicial er-
ror.84 Additionally, two defendants challenged the court's order to
have them shackled during the proceedings.8 5 Finally, one defendant
alleged errors during his competency hearing.8 6 Each of these issues
was resolved in favor of the People.8 7
529 (1991) (determining that the trial court's failure to instruct sua sponte on attempt
was harmless error).
80. People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 445, 821 P.2d 610, 680-81, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106,
176-77 (1991) (finding harmless an instruction that allowed the jury to consider immu-
nity when determining the credibility of a prosecution witness).
81. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
82. People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 806-09, 819 P.2d 436, 447-49, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
696, 707-09 (1991); Price, 1 Cal. 4th at 390-94, 821 P.2d at 643-46, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-
42; People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 1236-37, 812 P.2d 163, 187-89, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 168-
69 (1991).
83. In deciding a motion for change of venue, the court considers the following
factors: "(1) nature and gravity of the offense; (2) nature and extent of the media cov-
erage; (3) size of the community; (4) community status of the defendant; and (5) prom-
inence of the victim." Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1236-37, 812 P.2d at 188, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 168-
69 (citations omitted). Examining these five factors, the court determined that in all
three cases the trial court properly denied the motions for change of venue. See, e.g.,
Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 806-09, 819 P.2d at 447-49, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707-09.
84. People v. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 307, 821 P.2d 585, 599, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 95
(1991) (noting that a defendant has a constitutional right to waive his right to be pres-
ent during the proceedings); Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 809-11, 819 P.2d at 449-50, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 709-10 (reaffirming the constitutionality of a defendant's ability to waive
his right to be present during the proceedings and specifically determining that Ed-
wards' waiver was knowing and intelligent); Price, 1 Cal. 4th at 404-06, 821 P.2d at 653-
54, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149-50 (finding that the defendant waived his right to be present);
Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1237-40, 812 P.2d at 189-91, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 169. After the defend-
ant in Sully exploded in anger at the close of the guilt phase, stating that he would
continue to disrupt the proceeding, he voluntarily stated that he would not attend the
penalty phase. Id. Therefore, the supreme court concluded that the trial court prop-
erly permitted the defendant's absence from the penalty phase. Furthermore, having
told the jury the defendant's choice was voluntary, the trial court had no obligation to
instruct the jury, sua sponte, to disregard the defendant's absence.
85. People v. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173, 218-20, 821 P.2d 1302, 1321-22, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
426, 445-46 (1991) (holding that shackling a defendant at a preliminary hearing re-
quires a lesser showing than that required at trial since the jury is not present); Price,
1 Cal. 4th at 402-04, 821 P.2d at 652-53, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148-49 (finding that the record
fully supported the trial court's decision to shackle the defendant).
86. People v. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d 140, 180-85, 814 P.2d 290, 312-15, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511,
533-36 (1991) (considering the alleged errors during the competency phase as part of
the appeal from the death judgment and concluding that no reversal was required).
87. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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IV. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE ISSUES
In California, the death penalty may be imposed only if the defend-
ant is convicted of first degree murder and the jury finds one of the
statutorily defined special circumstances.88 In five of the cases sur-
veyed, the defendants asserted error during the special circumstances
phase of the trial.89 Two defendants asserted that the lying in wait
special circumstance 90 was improperly established;9 ' two claimed dis-
criminatory or vindictive prosecution;92 and one defendant argued
that the trial court erred by denying his motion for separate guilt and
88. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); see also 2 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMFs Punishment for Crime § 1026C (Supp. 1985). The most
common special circumstance is multiple murder. Other commonly found special cir-
cumstances include murder-robbery, murder-arson, murder-burglary, and murder-
rape. See generally John W. Poulos, The Lucas Court and Capital Punishment- The
Original Understanding of the Special Circumstances, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333
(1990) (discussing the application of special circumstances).
89. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 978-81, 820 P.2d 214, 239-41, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
112, 137-39 (1991); People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 821-29, 819 P.2d 436, 457-62, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 696, 717-22 (1991); Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th at 227-30, 821 P.2d at 1326-29, 3 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 450-53; People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 677-79, 818 P.2d 84, 117-18, 286 Cal. Rptr.
801, 834-35 (1991) (determining that two special circumstance findings were erroneous,
but holding that any error was harmless because two other special circumstances were
properly found); People v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411, 448-49, 814 P.2d 1273, 1293-95, 285
Cal. Rptr. 31, 51-53 (1991).
90. In People v. Morales, the supreme court set out the standards for the lying in
wait special circumstance. 48 Cal. 3d 527, 557, 770 P.2d 244, 260-61, 257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 80
(1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 984 (1989). The court defined lying in wait as
[a]n intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a
concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for
an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on
an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage, presents a factual matrix
sufficiently distinct from 'ordinary' premeditated murder to justify treating it
as a special circumstance.
Id. at 557, 770 P.2d at 260-61, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
91. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 821-26, 819 P.2d at 457-61, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717-21 (ap-
plying the Morales standard and rejecting the defendant's claims that instructional er-
ror occurred, that the lying in wait special circumstance is unconstitutional, and that
the evidence was not sufficient to support the claim); Webster, 54 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 814
P.2d at 1293-95, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 51-52 (rejecting the defendant's claim of instructional
error when the trial court told the jury that only a wanton and reckless intent to pro-
duce injury was necessary).
92. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 978-80, 820 P.2d at 239-40, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137-38 (hold-
ing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant access to
the People's capital prosecution policies and practices when he sought evidence that
the prosecutor's policies were arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory in determining
whether to charge a special circumstance); Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 826-29, 819 P.2d at
461-62, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721-22 (reasoning that the prosecutor did not act vindictively,
capriciously, or discriminatorily in amending the complaint to charge a special circum-
stance because the execution of a 12-year-old girl is particularly aggravated).
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special circumstance trials.93 Finally, in two instances the defendants
claimed instructional error.94 While none of the allegations led to re-
versal, the defendants did prevail on individual contentions95 and the
lying in wait special circumstance merited three dissenting
opinions.96
V. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
A. Boyd Error
In weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury may only
consider those aggravating factors which are specifically listed in Cal-
ifornia Penal Code section 190.3.97 Boyd error occurs when the jury
weighs factors not enumerated in section 190.3.98
In People v. Sully,99 the defendant argued that the trial court erred
93. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th at 228-30, 821 P.2d at 1330-31, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454-55 (hold-
ing that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion because it simply re-
quested separate juries and not separate trials).
94. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 980-81, 820 P.2d at 240-41, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138-39 (de-
termining that the instruction at issue was clear, unambiguous and adequate); Fierro, 1
Cal. 4th at 227-28, 821 P.2d at 1329-30, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453-54 (finding no reasonable
possibility that the instruction would mislead a reasonable juror).
95. See supra note 89.
96. In three separate opinions, Justices Mosk and Broussard claimed that People v.
Morales, 48 Cal. 3d 527, 557, 770 P.2d 244, 260-61, 257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 80 (1989), improp-
erly defined the lying in wait special circumstance by only requiring a concealment of
purpose. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 850, 819 P.2d at 447, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting); People v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411, 462-63, 814 P.2d 1273,
1302-04, 285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 60-62 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); Id at 463-68, 814
P.2d at 1304-07, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 62-65 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). Both
argue that the lying in wait special circumstance requires actual watching and physi-
cal concealment, and not mere concealment of purpose. Il at 401, 814 P.2d at 1302, 285
Cal. Rptr. at 60 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk argued that in its
present form, the lying in wait special circumstance simply proves premeditation and,
therefore, encompasses all first degree murders; consequently, the current lying in
wait special circumstance is unconstitutional because it does not help the court single
out the defendant that actually deserves the death penalty. Il (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
97. People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 775-76, 700 P.2d 782, 791-92, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10-
11 (1985). The factors that the jury may consider are the following:
(a) The circumstances of the crime; (b) other violent criminal activity; (c)
prior felony convictions; (d) extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (e) vic-
tim participation or consent; (f) reasonable belief in moral justification or ex-
tenuation; (g) extreme duress or substantial domination; (h) impairment
through mental disease or defect or through intoxication; (i) age; (j) status as
an accomplice and minor participant; and (k) any other extenuating fact.
People v. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th 103, 151-53, 820 P.2d 559, 587-88, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335,
363-64 (1991) (Mosk, J., concurring). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1991).
98. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d at 775, 700 P.2d at 791, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 10. "Evidence of de-
fendant's background, character, or conduct which is not probative of any specific
listed factor would have no tendency to prove or disprove a fact of consequence to the
determination of the action, and is therefore irrelevant to aggravation." Id. at 774, 700
P.2d at 790-91, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
99. 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 812 P.2d 163, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1991).
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by failing to instruct the jury that it could only consider the aggravat-
ing factors enumerated in section 190.3.lo0 The court rejected this ar-
gument, reasoning that since the trial court instructed the jury to
make its penalty determination "in light of the statutory factors,"
and because the prosecutor did not urge the jury to consider anything
other than the statutory factors, there was no basis to infer that the
jury considered anything but the aggravating factors.i0i
Although Boyd generally prohibits evidence of aggravating factors
not specified in section 190.3, the prosecution may admit such evi-
dence to rebut a defendant's presentation of mitigating evidence. 02
In People v. Bacigalupo,i0 3 the defense presented mitigating evidence
of the defendant's kind and sensitive nature.104 The supreme court
upheld the prosecution's introduction of rebuttal evidence tending to
show the defendant's violent nature.105 In People v. Fierro,106 the
court upheld prosecution evidence of the defendant's gang activities
to rebut defense evidence of the defendant's participation in socially
useful activities. 07 In People v. Nicolaus,0 8 the court determined
that the prosecution properly introduced evidence of the defendant's
hatred of the victim's "stripe of Christianity" to rebut the defendant's
statement that he never intended to kill her.109 Finally, in People v.
100. Id. at 1241, 812 P.2d at 191-92, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
101. Id. at 1242, 812 P.2d at 192, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
102. People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 581, 817 P.2d 893, 909, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 644
(1991). "Once the defense has presented evidence of circumstances admissible under
[section 190.3] factor (k) ... prosecution rebuttal evidence would be admissible as evi-
dence tending to disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action." Id. (quoting People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 776, 700 P.2d 782, 792,
215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11 (1985)). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992).
103. 1 Cal. 4th 103, 820 P.2d 559, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (1991).
104. Id. at 140, 820 P.2d at 580, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 355 (holding that counsel for the
defense may offer any aspect of a defendant's character as a mitigating factor). See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). See generally 3 B. WITKIN &
N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime § 1608 (2d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1992).
105. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 140, 820 P.2d at 580, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356. "When the
defense presents mitigating evidence of a defendant's good character, it has put the de-
fendant's character at issue, thus opening the door to prosecution evidence tending to
rebut that 'specific asserted aspect of the [defendant's] personality.'" Id. (quoting Peo-
ple v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 792 n.24, 726 P.2d 113, 253-54 n.24, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667,
707-08 n.24 (1986)).
106. 1 Cal. 4th 173, 821 P.2d 1302, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (1991).
107. Id. at 238, 821 P.2d at 1334, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458 (1991). "Membership in
youth gangs was relevant to the issue of defendant's character and activities as a youth
and specifically rebutted the direct testimony of the witness. Accordingly [it] consti-
tuted proper rebuttal." Id.
108. 54 Cal. 3d 551, 817 P.2d 893, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1991).
109. Id. at 581, 817 P.2d at 909, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 644 (reasoning that the fact that the
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Mickle,11O the court found that the defendant had waived his Boyd
objection."'1
B. Factor (b) and Factor (c) Error
During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury balances the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors enunciated in section 190.3 to determine
whether the defendant's actions merit the death penalty.112 Factor
(b) allows the court to consider prior criminal conduct involving the
use or attempted use of force or violence and factor (c) allows the
court to consider the presence or absence of any prior felony
convictions.113
In People v. Bacigalupo,114 the defendant challenged the trial
court's interpretation of factors (b) and (c). However, since the
supreme court had previously considered most of the defendant's
claims, it simply reaffirmed its position that "an 'acquittal' [does] not
include a charge dismissed as part of a plea bargain" under factor
(c); 115 factor (b) encompasses criminal activity that occurred anytime
during the defendant's lifetime;"18 evidence of aiding and abetting a
violent crime is admissible under factor (b);"17 and felonious conduct
in another jurisdiction can be considered under factor (c), even if
such conduct is considered only a misdemeanor in California.118 Con-
defendant hated his wife's "stripe of Christianity" was relevant to show motive for the
murder).
110. 54 Cal. 3d 140, 814 P.2d 290, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1991).
111. Id at 186, 814 P.2d at 316, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
112. For a complete list of the aggravating and mitigating factors the court can con-
sider under section 190.3, see supra note 97.
113. California Penal Code section 190.3 provides in pertinent part:
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the
following factors if relevant:.. .(b) [t]he presence or absence of criminal activ-
ity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or vio-
lence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence [and] (c) the
presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). The court clarified the distinction
between the two sections: factor (b) encompasses any violent criminal activity regard-
less of conviction and factor (c) encompasses any prior felony conviction whether vio-
lent or not. People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 773-76, 700 P.2d 782, 791-93, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1,
9-11 (1985).
114. 1 Cal. 4th 103, 820 P.2d 559, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (1991).
115. Id. at 131, 820 P.2d at 573, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349. The court had previously re-
jected a similar claim. See, e.g., People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 193, 753 P.2d 629,
659-60, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 703-04, cert denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
116. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 134, 820 P.2d at 575, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351. See, e.g.,
People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 202, 711 P.2d 480, 514, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 217-18
(1985).
117. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 136-38, 820 P.2d at 576-77, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352-53.
See, e.g., People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 633, 802 P.2d 376, 410-11, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874,
909 (1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 420 (1991).
118. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 138-39, 820 P.2d at 578, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354-55. "It is
not arbitrary or capricious to allow a jury deciding penalty to consider a defendant's
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sequently, the court rejected all of the defendant's contentions in
Bacigalupo.
In People v. Breaux,l"9 the court examined the applicability of dis-
covery principles to evidence presented under factors (b) and (c).120
The court determined that the principles of discovery do apply to the
penalty phase provided "the relitigation of the 'other crime'. . . is cir-
cumscribed by the bounds of relevance and admissibility of evidence
that prevails in the original prosecution."' 2 '
Allegations of factor (b) and factor (c) error arose in four other
cases as well, 2 2 with the supreme court resolving these issues in
favor of the People in each instance. 2
3
C. Factor (7c)
Under factor (k),124 the trial court instructs the jury that it may
consider "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of
willingness to engage in felonious conduct even if that conduct is not felonious in Cali-
fornia." Md
119. 1 Cal. 4th 281, 821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (1991).
120. Id. at 311 n.10, 821 P.2d at 602 n.10, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98 n.10.
121. I, In Breaux, the supreme court held that the trial court acted within its dis-
cretion in limiting discovery to records prior to the battery on the police officer, as op-
posed to a period of time after the battery. Id However, in his concurring opinion,
Justice Mosk pointed out that discovery principles do not draw a line at the time of the
conviction and the court should allow discovery of records subsequent to the convic-
tion. Id at 322-23, 821 P.2d at 609-10, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-06 (Mosk, J., concurring).
122. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 981-85, 820 P.2d 214, 241-43, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
112, 139-41 (1991) (holding that only felony convictions entered prior to the perpetra-
tion of the capital offense can be considered under factor (c), but reasoning that even
though the felony assault presented in this case did not fulfill this requirement, any
error was harmless because the jury could consider the assault under factor (b)); Peo-
ple v. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173, 249-52, 821 P.2d 1302, 1342-44, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 466-68
(1991) (finding that the jury understood it was not supposed to double count defend-
ant's past felony convictions under both factor (b) and (c)); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th
324, 470-71, 821 P.2d 610, 697-98, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 193-94 (1991) (reasoning that the
presentation of misdemeanor evidence only led to harmless error because there were
no facts to suggest that the court told the jury that it could consider the misdemeanor
when determining penalty); People v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411, 452-54, 814 P.2d 1273,
1297-98, 285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 55-56 (1991).
In Webster, the court noted that factors (b) and (c) may overlap, but both are dis-
tinct from factor (a). While factor (c) is limited to criminal conduct which occurred
prior to the commission of the capital crime, factor (b) is not. IM. The court thus rea-
soned that the jury could have considered the robbery, which occurred after the mur-
der, under factor (b), and that therefore no prejudice occurred. I&
123. See supra note 122.
124. Factor (k) error concerns jury instructions given under California Penal Code
section 190.3 (k). Under factor (k), a jury may consider as a mitigating factor "[a]ny
other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a
legal excuse for the crime." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
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the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a ba-
sis for a sentence less than death."'12m In four of the cases surveyed,
the defendants alleged that the factor (k) instruction did not ade-
quately inform the jury of its ability to take into account other miti-
gating factors.126 Finding that no error had occurred, the supreme
court rejected the defendant's claim in all four instances.127
D. Victim Impact Evidence
In Booth v. Maryland 128 and South Carolina v. Gathers ,129 the
United States Supreme Court established that the presentation of ev-
idence concerning the crime's impact on the victim and the victim's
family'3 0 violates a defendant's Eighth Amendment rights.131 Booth
and Gathers generally barred admission of victim impact evidence132
and related prosecution argument during the penalty phase of a capi-
tal trial. 133
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court overruled
both Booth and Gathers in Payne v. Tennessee,134 holding that the in-
troduction of evidence relating to the victim's personal character or
the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family does not of-
fend the Eighth Amendment. 3 5 It is important to note that the
Court in Payne did not mandate the use of victim impact evidence in
See also 3 B. WiTKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFoRNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Punishment for
Crimes § 1608 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992).
125. CALJIC No. 8.855(k) (5th ed. 1988).
126. People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 841-42, 819 P.2d 436, 471, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696,
731 (1991) (holding that the trial court's factor (k) catch-all instruction was sufficient
to instruct the jury on the full range of mitigating evidence); People v. Nicolaus, 54
Cal. 3d 551, 586-87, 817 P.2d 893, 912-13, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 647-48 (1991) (holding that
the factor (k) instruction was sufficient to allow jury to consider extreme mental or
emotional disturbance); People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 1244-45, 812 P.2d 163, 193-94,
283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 174-75 (1991) (holding that the factor (k) instruction encompasses
any lingering doubt the jury may have about the defendant's guilt and that therefore
no special instruction is required); Webster, 54 Cal. 3d at 450, 814 P.2d at 1295, 285 Cal.
Rptr. at 53 (holding that the jury members would understand that factor (k) instruc-
tion allowed them to consider the defendant's character and background).
127. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
128. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
129. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
130. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-07; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-11.
131. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VIII.
132. In its broadest definition, victim impact evidence appears to include "(1) the
effect of the crime on the victim; (2) the victim's personal characteristics; (3) the emo-
tional impact of the crime on the victim's family (and perhaps others); and (4) the
opinions about the crime and the criminal held by family members (and perhaps
others)." People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 852, 819 P.2d 436, 478, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696,
738 (1991) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. Id. at 833, 819 P.2d at 465, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
134. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
135. Id, at 2609.
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capital cases.' 3 6 It merely held that a State's decision to permit the
introduction of victim impact evidence would not violate a defend-
ant's Eighth Amendment rights.137
In People v. Edwards,l 38 the prosecution sought to introduce photo-
graphs of victims and present argument concerning the impact of the
crime on the victim's family. 3 9 The defendant asserted that,
notwithstanding Eighth Amendment considerations, victim impact
evidence was inadmissible in California because it did not come
within any of the aggravating factors listed in section 190.3.140 The
defendant cited People v. Gordon,141 which held that "the effect of
the crime on the victim's family is not relevant to any material cir-
cumstance."142 The California Supreme Court decided that because
Gordon relied on Booth and Gathers, it should be reconsidered in
light of Payne.143
The court first noted that prior to Booth and Gathers, California
permitted the admission of victim impact evidence as a circumstance
of the crime under factor (a) of section 190.3.144 The court then ob-
served that two recent California Supreme Court cases had undercut
Gordon's assumption that the effect of the crime on the victim's fam-
ily is not relevant to any material circumstance. 145 Concluding that
Gordon's assumption was no longer valid under Payne,146 the court
136. See People v. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d 140, 200, 814 P.2d 290, 325, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511,
546 (1991) (Mosk, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring) "A State may legitimately conclude that evidence
about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant
to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed."
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
138. 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991).
139. Id. at 832-33, 819 P.2d at 464-65, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724-25.
140. Id. at 833, 819 P.2d at 465, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725. See supra note 97 for the
aggravating factors specified in section 190.3.
141. 50 Cal. 3d 1223, 792 P.2d 251, 270 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
1123 (1991).
142. Id. at 1266-67, 792 P.2d at 277-78, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78.
143. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 834, 819 P.2d at 466, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
144. Id. (citing People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640
(1982)). Factor (a) allows the trier of fact to take into account "[t]he circumstances of
the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding." CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 190.3(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
145. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 835, 819 P.2d at 466, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726. See People v.
Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 536, 788 P.2d 640, 680, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 166 (1990) (finding no
error when the prosecutor argued, "This is a tragedy, not just for the person you
killed, but the family and society") and People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 795-97, 802
P.2d 330, 827-28, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 852-53 (1990) (upholding argument relating to the
impact that the defendant's other criminal conduct had upon the victims).
146. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 835, 819 F.2d at 466, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
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held that factor (a) of section 190.3 allows evidence and argument on
the specific harm that the defendant caused, including the impact on
the family of the victim.147 Accordingly, the court determined that
the photographs were admissible.148
In three other cases, the California Supreme Court, relying on
Payne, allowed the admission of victim impact evidence as circum-
stances of the crime under factor (a).149 In two other cases in which
the defendant alleged Booth error, the court found that Booth con-
cerns were not implicated. 5 0
147. Id, Two justices did not agree with this holding. Justice Kennard believed
that the photographs were admissible under factor (a) as a circumstance of the crime
because the photographs showed what the defendant saw while he committed the
crimes. Hence, Justice Kennard did not reach the issue of admissibility of victim im-
pact evidence. Id. at 849-50, 819 P.2d at 476-77, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736-37 (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority's finding that victim impact evidence was a
"circumstance of the crime" under factor (a). He argued that Gordon was based on
section 190.3 rather than Booth and Gathers. Hence, the reversal of Booth and Gathers
should not have had an effect on the continuing validity of Gordon's holding. Mosk
concluded that the photographs in this case were admissible, however, as evidence rel-
evant to a circumstance of the crime, because they revealed the girls themselves. Id. at
855, 819 P.2d at 480, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 740 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
148. Id. at 836, 819 P.2d at 487, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727.
149. In People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214 (1991),
the court held that comments bearing on the victim's personal characteristics and the
emotional impact of the crime on her family were circumstances of the crime under
section 190.3. Id. at 990-91, 820 P.2d at 247-48, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46 (citing People v.
Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 795-97, 802 P.2d 330, 355-58, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 852-53 (1990)).
The court then concluded that, according to Payne, the Eighth Amendment did not
bar such evidence. Id.
In People v. Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173, 821 P.2d 1302, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (1991), the court
held that statements regarding the effect of the crime on the victim's wife were not
barred by Eighth Amendment, but rather were admissible under section 190.3(a) as
one of the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 235, 821 P.2d at 1332, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
456.
In dissent, Justice Kennard agreed that, after Payne, the Eighth Amendment no
longer barred victim impact evidence, but she disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that such evidence was admissible in California as a "circumstance of the crime" under
section 190.3. Kennard argued that the majority's expansive definition of "circum-
stances" was contrary to the word's plain meaning as well as its judicial interpretation.
Id. at 259-62, 821 P.2d at 1348-51, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472-75 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting). Kennard also argued that the majority's dictionary definition of the word
("that which surrounds materially, morally, or logically") was so broad that it would
encompass the rest of the factors listed in section 190.3, and hence make their enumer-
ation unnecessary. Id. at 263, 821 P.2d at 1351, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Kennard concluded that "circumstances of the crime" should
include only "those factors and circumstances either known to the defendant when he
or she committed the capital crime or properly adduced in proof of the charges adjudi-
cated at the guilt phase." Id. at 264, 821 P.2d at 1352, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476 (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
In People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 817 P.2d 893, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1991), the court
properly admitted statements regarding the effect of the crime on the victim's family.
Id. at 584-85, 817 P.2d at 911, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
150. In People v. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104 (1991), the
supreme court reasoned that the trial court properly admitted a statement by the vic-
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In People v. Bacigalupo,'5 l the defendant asserted that the trial
court erroneously excluded a minister's statements describing the po-
tential impact on the defendant's mother if the defendant were sen-
tenced to death.152 The defendant first recognized that under Payne,
"impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's
decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be im-
posed."153 He then argued that the impact of the death penalty on a
defendant's family was equally relevant to the penalty determination,
and admissible as mitigating evidence. 5 4 Without addressing the is-
sue, the California Supreme Court held that, even if such testimony
was relevant mitigating evidence, the trial court committed no error
by excluding it because the defendant's mother had already '"eg[ged]
the jury to spare defendant's life."'15 5 Thus, the proffered statements
would have been cumulative.15 6
The court faced the same issue in People v. Fierro.157 There, the
defendant argued that the trial court erred by sustaining the prosecu-
tor's objection to a question designed to elicit evidence concerning the
emotional impact of a death sentence on the defendant's family.158
The supreme court found no prejudicial error because the question
was rephrased and subsequently answered.159 However, the court ex-
pressly avoided the issue of whether a defendant has a right to intro-
duce evidence regarding the impact of the death penalty on his
family. The court merely "assum[ed] without deciding" that the de-
fendant had such a right, and held that it was not violated.160
tim's mother in application for modification of the verdict because the holding in Booth
has never applied to such proceedings. Id. at 320-21, 821 P.2d at 606, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
104 (citing People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d 955, 810 P.2d 131 (1991); People v. Benson, 52
Cal. 3d 754, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1990); People v. Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d 963,
760 P.2d 475, 251 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1988)).
Similarly, statements in People v. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d 140, 814 P.2d 290, 284 Cal. Rptr.
511 (1991), concerning the obvious emotional effect of the defendant's prior sexual mo-
lestations on the victims, did not implicate Booth. Id at 187-88, 814 P.2d at 316-17, 284
Cal. Rptr. at 537-38 (citing People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr.
827 (1990)). Such statements were admissible as circumstances of the prior crimes
bearing on the defendant's culpability. Id
151. 1 Cal. 4th 103, 820 P.2d 559, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (1991).
152. Id at 142, 820 P.2d at 580-81, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356-57.
153. Id (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991)).
154. Id.
155. Id
156. Id.
157. 1 Cal. 4th 173, 821 P.2d 1302, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (1991).
158. Id. at 241, 821 P.2d at 1336, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460.
159. Id
160. Id
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The court's holdings in Bacigalupo and Fierro leave open a very in-
teresting question: Does Payne, which allows evidence regarding im-
pact of the murder on the victim's family, also allow evidence
regarding impact of the death penalty on the defendant's family?
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct
In six of the cases surveyed, the defendants contended that the
prosecutor used deceptive methods to persuade the court during the
penalty phase.161 The supreme court found error in a few instances,
but for the most part determined that the error was either waived for
lack of a timely objection or was harmless.162
F. Brown Error
Brown error stems from the court's concern that section 190.3 of
the California Penal Code might mislead the jury about its responsi-
bilities in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.8 3 Section
190.3, and former CALJIC 8.84.2, informs the jury that it "shall" im-
pose a sentence of death if it concludes that the aggravating circum-
stances "outweigh" the mitigating circumstances.164 A juror might
reasonably understand such language to define the penalty determi-
161. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 987-93, 820 P.2d 214, 245-49, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
112, 143-47 (1991) (holding that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments
about the defendant's past sexual activity and remorse did not require reversal); Peo-
ple v. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 312-14, 821 P.2d 585, 603-04, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 99-100
(1991) (reasoning that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments on the de-
fendant's lack of remorse did not relate to his failure to testify and therefore no error
occurred); Ferro, 1 Cal. 4th at 232-34, 821 P.2d at 1330-31, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454-55
(finding no indication that the prosecutor improperly questioned witnesses, and con-
cluding that the prosecutor's comments about the jury's responsibilities in giving the
death penalty did not lead to reversible error); People v. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d 140, 190-92,
814 P.2d 290, 318-20, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511, 539-41 (1991) (stating that the prosecutor's
cross-examination of the defendant was in good faith and otherwise finding no miscon-
duct); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 473-85, 821 P.2d 610, 699-707, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106,
195-203 (1991) (finding that although the defendant alleged prosecutorial misconduct at
various phases of the lengthy trial, on review, none of the alleged misconduct
amounted to reversible error); People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 1248, 812 P.2d 163, 195,
283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 176 (1991) (finding that any objection regarding alleged misconduct
during closing arguments was waived). See also supra notes 55-61 and accompanying
text for a discussion of prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase.
162. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
163. See Death Penalty Law III, supra note 2 at 557 (citing People v. Brown, 40 Cal.
3d 512, 53844, 709 P.2d 440, 453-59, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 650-56 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987)).
164. Section 190.3 provides that "the trier of fact shall . . . impose a sentence of
death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
Former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 states, "If you conclude that the aggravating circum-
stances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death."
CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1979), amended by CALJIC 8.84.2 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis
added).
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nation as simply a finding of facts or a mere mechanical counting of
factors.16 5 The Brown court stated that the jury must perform a
mental balancing process, but not one which calls for a mere mechan-
ical counting of aggravating and mitigating factors on each side of an
"imaginary scale."166 Rather than applying an arithmetic formula,
Brown requires jurors to make a moral assessment of the facts as
they relate to the appropriateness of the death penalty.16 7 Brown er-
ror occurs if an instruction misleads jurors as to the scope of their
sentencing discretion. 6 8
In People v. Webster,169 the defendant argued that the court erred
by instructing the jury, pursuant to California Penal Code section
190.3 (former CALJIC 8.84.2), that it "'shall' impose the death pen-
alty if it determines that the aggravating circumstances 'outweigh'
those in mitigation."170 But the court found no error because the
trial court also instructed the jury that the mere counting of opposing
factors was wrong, and that the particular weight of the aggravating
and mitigating factors was not determined by their relative number,
but by their relative convincing force on the ultimate question of
punishment.171 Thus, the court concluded that the instructions could
not have misled the jury about its discretion to impose the appropri-
ate penalty.172
In People v. Mickey, 173 the trial court instructed the jury pursuant
to the potentially misleading language in section 190.3. However, the
supreme court held that no Brown error occurred because both the
prosecutor and the defense counsel made it clear in their summations
that the jurors were required to make a moral assessment of the de-
165. People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 699, 818 P.2d 84, 132, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 849
(1991).
166. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 541, 709 P.2d at 456, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
167. Md The Brown court stated,
"By directing that the jury 'shall' impose the death penalty if it finds that ag-
gravating circumstances 'outweigh' mitigating, the statute should not be un-
derstood to require any juror to vote for the death penalty unless, upon
completion of the 'weighing' process, he decides that death is the appropriate
penalty under all circumstances. Thus the jury, by weighing the various fac-
tors, simply determines under the relevant evidence which penalty is appro-
priate in the particular case."
ACL
168. Id, at 540-44, 709 P.2d at 455-59, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 652-56.
169. 54 Cal. 3d 411, 814 P.2d 1273, 285 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1991).
170. Id at 451, 814 P.2d at 1295-96, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 53-54. For the text of former
CALJIC 8.84.2, see supra note 164.
171. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d at 451, 814 P.2d at 1296, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
172. Id
173. 54 Cal. 3d 612, 818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1991).
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fendant and his crimes in determining the appropriate penalty.174
The other four death penalty appeals that alleged Brown error 175
challenged the modified version of CALJIC 8.84.2.176 All four cases
challenged the instructions on the same grounds: the meaning, con-
notation and effect of the words "simply," "substantial," and
"warranted."
1. Use of the word "simply"
As modified, CALJIC 8.84.2 instructs the jury to "simply deter-
mine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and ap-
propriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances
with the totality of the mitigating circumstances."177 In two of the
four cases that disputed the validity of modified CALJIC 8.84.2, the
defendant argued that use of the word "simply" trivialized the enor-
mity of the jury's task and undermined its sense of responsibility
about its role. The court consistently rejected this contention, noting
that prior cases had rejected that precise argument as well.178
2. Use of the words "substantial" and "warranted"
The modified version of CALJIC 8.84.2 also states that "[t]o return
a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggra-
vating evidence and circumstances are so substantial in comparison
with the mitigating circumstances, that it warrants death instead of
life without parole."179 In three of the four cases, the defendant ar-
gued that the word "substantial" was so vague that it failed to inform
174. Id. at 700, 818 P.2d at 132, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
175. People v. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 821 P.2d 585, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (1991); People
v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991); People v. Nicolaus,
54 Cal. 3d 551, 817 P.2d 893, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1991); People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195,
812 P.2d 163, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1991).
176. The modified version of CALJIC 8.84.2 provides, in pertinent part:
The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a
mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the
arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign
whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of
the various factors you are permitted to consider.
In weighing the various circumstances, you simply determine under the rel-
evant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the
totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating
circumstances. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded
that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the
mitigating circumstances, that it warrants death instead of life without parole.
CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1987).
177. See supra note 176.
178. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 590, 817 P.2d at 915, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 650; Sully, 53 Cal.
3d at 1243, 812 P.2d at 193, 283 Cal, Rptr. at 174. See also Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 841,
819 P.2d at 471, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 (citations omitted) (upholding the validity of
modified CALJIC 8.84.2 in its entirety).
179. CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
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the jurors of the required findings in order to impose death. Three of
the defendants also contended that the word "warrants" imposed too
low a standard for the imposition of death, and directed the jury's at-
tention away from the crucial question of whether the death penalty
is "appropriate." The court rejected the arguments in each case.18 0
G. Cumulative Prejudice
The supreme court must determine whether the cumulative effect
of trial errors, though individually harmless, should result in a total
reversal.' 8 ' In seven cases the court examined whether cumulative
prejudice required reversal of the death penalty. The court rejected
the argument in each case.'8 2
H. Proportionality Review
There are two types of proportionality review: intercase and intra-
case. The supreme court reaffirmed its unwillingness to practice in-
tercase review, which examines the defendant's case in relation to
similar cases.183 But in two cases, the court did engage in intracase
180. People v. Breaux, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 315-16, 821 P.2d 585, 605, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81,
101 (1991) (holding that use of the word "substantial" was not error and finding the
contention regarding the word "warranted" to be spurious); Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d at 591,
817 P.2d at 915, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 650; Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1243-44, 812 P.2d at 193, 283
Cal. Rptr. at 174 (holding that the charge to the jury, considered as a whole, ade-
quately conveyed the seriousness of its task and the legally appropriate manner of per-
forming it).
181. People v. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d 432, 446-48, 758 P.2d 1135, 1144-45, 250 Cal. Rptr.
604, 613-15 (1988) (discussing the application of cumulative prejudice). See generally B.
JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE LAW § 22.1 (1985); 6 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE, Reversible Error § 756 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 9 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Appeal § 359 (3d ed. 1985); 5 Am. JuR. 2D Appeal & Error § 789 (1962 &
Supp. 1988); 5 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 554 (1973).
182. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 1006, 820 P.2d 214, 258, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112,
156 (1991) (finding that the errors were infrequent and minimally significant and could
not have resulted in the defendant's detriment); People v. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th 103,
148-49, 820 P.2d 559, 585, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 361 (1991) (holding that the few errors
that did occur were clearly harmless); Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 846, 819 P.2d at 474, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 734 (determining that the few errors that the court found do not merit re-
versal); People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 706, 818 P.2d 84, 136, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 853
(1991) (finding that the evidence clearly supported the conviction); People v. Mickle,
54 Cal. 3d 140, 197, 814 P.2d 290, 323, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511, 544 (1991) (stating that the
errors did not undermine the validity of the verdict); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324,
491, 821 P.2d 610, 711, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 207 (1991) (finding that since no errors were
prejudicial, no reversal was required); Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1249, 812 P.2d at 197-98, 283
Cal. Rptr. at 178-79 (concluding after a complete review of the record that the cumula-
tive impact of all errors is not sufficient for reversal).
183. E.g., People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 645, 802 P.2d 376, 419, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874,
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review, that is, it examined whether the death penalty was dispropor-
tionate to the defendant's personal culpability.84 In both cases the
supreme court held that based upon the underlying facts, the death
penalty was not disproportionate. 8 5
L Automatic Motion for Modification of Verdict
In every death penalty case, the trial court must automatically con-
sider whether to modify the verdict.18 6 The court makes this deter-
mination by weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances,
ultimately deciding whether the jury's finding was "contrary to law
or the evidence presented."'l In seven of the cases surveyed, the
supreme court rejected the claim that the trial court improperly con-
sidered the motion for modification.l88
917 (1990). Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment does note require intercase review.
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51-54 (1984). See also, U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
184. E.g., People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 478-89, 668 P.2d 697, 719-27, 194 Cal. Rptr.
390, 412-20 (1983). See also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (allowing the court to review the
death penalty under intracase review).
185. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 151-52, 820 P.2d at 586-87, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362-63
(reasoning that as the defendant had served two previous prison terms, the death pen-
alty was not a disproportionate sentence for the double murder/robbery); People v.
Fierro, 1 Cal. 4th 173, 253-54, 821 P.2d 1302, 1344-45, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 468-69 (1991)
(reasoning that the death penalty was not disproportionate to the defendant's culpabil-
ity because the defendant shot the victim once and then straddled the victim and shot
again). See generally Steven M. Sprenger, Note, A Critical Evaluation of State
Supreme Court Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IOWA L. REv. 719
(1988).
186. Section 190.4(e) requires, inter alia, that "[i]n every case in which the trier of
fact has returned a verdict or finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall
be deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict." Id. See gen-
erally 3 B. WiTKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime
§ 1618 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991); 22 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 3347 (1985); Death
Penalty Law III, supra note 2 at 547-48.
187. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West Supp. 1991). California Penal Code section
1385(a) states that "[t]he judge or magistrate may, either on his or her own motion...
and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." Id. See also CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1181(7) (West 1988) (allowing a judge to modify a verdict "by imposing [a]
lesser punishment without granting or ordering a new trial").
188. People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 1006-09, 820 P.2d 214, 258-60, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
112, 156-58 (1991) (finding that the trial court properly considered aggravating and mit-
igating factors and victim impact evidence); Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 149-50, 820 P.2d at
585-86, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362-63 (reasoning that the trial court did not rely on state-
ments by the victim's family or a probation report in denying the automatic motion for
modification and consequently no error occurred); People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787,
846-48, 819 P.2d 436, 474-76, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 734-36 (1991) (stating that the trial
court properly examined aggravating and mitigating evidence in its decision); Fierro, 1
Cal. 4th at 252-53, 821 P.2d at 3134, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468 (finding that the trial court
properly considered aggravating circumstances under factors (b) and (c) and determin-
ing that even though the trial court improperly examined probation reports, they
could not have affected its ruling); People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 703-05, 818 P.2d 84,
135-36, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 852-53 (1991) (stating that the trial judge properly reweighed
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determining that the weight
of the evidence supported the verdict); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 490-91, 821 P.2d
610, 710-11, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 206-07 (1991) (finding that the presentence report did
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J. Constitut-ionality of the Death Penalty Act of 1978
Six of the defendants alleged that the death penalty was unconsti-
tutional. 8 9 The supreme court refused to revisit the issue and re-
jected the claim in each instance.190
K Miscellawous Penalty Phase Contentions
This section addresses additional penalty phase errors raised on ap-
peal. One of the defendants claimed Davenport error,191 which oc-
curs when the absence of mitigating evidence is presented as an
aggravating factor.192 Three of the defendants claimed that the court
improperly allowed the jury to consider age as an aggravating or mit-
igating factor pursuant to factor (i).193 Finally, in People v. Mickle,194
not influence the trial court's examination of the motion for modification); People v.
Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 1249-0, 812 P.2d 163, 197-98, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 178-79 (1991)
(determining that the trial court properly examined aggravating and mitigating factors
and stating that even though the trial court should not have considered a probation
report, any possible error was harmless).
189. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d at 1009-10, 820 P.2d at 260, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158; Baci-
galupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 146-48, 820 P.2d at 583-85, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359-61; Edwards, 54
Cal. 3d at 848, 819 P.2d at 476, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736; Ferro, 1 Cal. 4th at 255, 821 P.2d
at 1345-46, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469-70; People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 589, 817 P.2d
893, 914, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 649 (1991); Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1250-51, 812 P.2d at 198, 283
Cal. Rptr. at 179.
190. E.g., Sully, 53 Cal. 3d at 1250-51, 812 P.2d at 198, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 179. The
court had previously determined that
the 1978 death penalty statute... does not require: (1) written findings as to
the aggravating factors found by the jury; (2) proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of the aggravating factors; (3) jury unanimity on the aggravating factors; (4) a
finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reason-
able doubt: (5) a finding that death is the appropriate punishment beyond a
reasonable doubt; (6) a "procedure to enable the reviewing court to evaluate
meaningfully the sentencer's decision."
Id. (citations omitted).
191. See People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 288-89, 710 P.2d 861, 888, 221 Cal. Rptr.
794, 821 (1985).
192. Bacigalupo, 1 Cal. 4th at 143-45, 820 P.2d at 581-82, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357-58
(determining thai; the prosecutor used the framework of section 190.3 for her closing
argument and consequently did not argue lack of mitigating evidence as an aggravating
factor).
193. "In determining the penalty, the trier or fact shall take into account any of the
following factors if relevant:... (i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(i) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). The court has stated:
In our view, the word "age" in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a met-
onym for age.related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experi-
ence or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty.
Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every
case.
People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 302, 753 P.2d 1052, 1080, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 28-29 (1988).
People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 844, 819 P.2d 436, 473, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 733
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the defendant complained about the examination of an expert wit-
ness concerning the expert's personal viewpoint on the appropriate-
ness of the death penalty.195 Finding no reversible error in this case,
the supreme court nonetheless stated that "[i]n future cases, trial
courts should preclude examination of an expert witness on the ap-
propriateness of death in a particular case."'19 The supreme court re-
solved all alleged penalty phase errors in favor of the People.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this survey goes to print, the death penalty has once again
surged to the forefront of California law and politics. The contro-
versy over Robert Alton Harris' execution97 on April 21, 1992, has
resurrected age old philosophical and moral questions about the ap-
propriateness of the death penalty. Although the press and media
often portray the death penalty as a divisive, controversial issue, a re-
cent poll shows that eighty percent of California adults favor the ulti-
mate sanction, while only fourteen percent oppose it.198 A sharp
increase of death penalty supporters in the 1970s,199 along with the
passage of the 1978 California Death Penalty Act and the current
widespread support of the death penalty,2 00 seem to reflect the pub-
lic's growing concern about the senseless, indiscriminate, brutal, and
heinous murders that continue to plague society.
Unfortunately, the number of convicted murderers on death row
(1991) (finding that it is the jury's responsibility to determine whether age is a mitigat-
ing or an aggravating factor); People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal. 3d 551, 587-88, 817 P.2d 893,
913, 286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 648 (1991) (determining that the prosecutor's comment that the
death penalty would not "deprive [the defendant] of a long or potentially productive
life as it would a young man" was clearly erroneous, but produced no prejudice to the
defendant); People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 1247, 812 P.2d 163, 195, 283 Cal. Rptr. 144,
176 (1991) (stating that age is not only a mitigating factor).
194. 54 Cal. 3d 140, 814 P.2d 290, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1991).
195. Id at 194-97, 814 P.2d at 321-23, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 542-44.
196. Id. at 196, 814 P.2d at 322-23, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44. Two expert witnesses in
Mickle testified on the appropriateness of the death penalty. Since the two witnesses
had different viewpoints, the jury heard both sides of the argument, so any error was
harmless. Id at 196, 814 P.2d at 323, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
197. Scott Armstrong, Capital Punishment Is on the Rise; California on Verge of
an Execution, CMUSTIAN Sci. MONITO, March 25, 1992, at 1.
198. Poll Shows Californians Widely Favor Executions, Reuters, Apr. 2, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, CURRNT file.
199. Id
200. Id Resurging support for the death penalty is not unique to California. In
fact, polls have shown that three out of four Americans favor capital punishment.
Armstrong, supra note 197 at 1.
Recently, Arizona carried out its first death penalty in 29 years, and Delaware exe-
cuted its first prisoner in 46 years. James Bone, America Gears for Wave of Execu-
tions, TIMES, Mar. 28, 1992, at Overseas News. Since the United States Supreme Court
reinstated the death penalty in 1976, over 2500 convicted murderers have found their
way to death row. Id With their avenues of appeal diminishing, the pace of execu-
tions will increase. Id
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continues to rise. Although more than three hundred convicts cur-
rently sit on death row,2 01 Robert Alton Harris was the first put to
death in California in over a quarter of a century.2 02 Harris had been
on death row for thirteen years, with his case making the United
States Supreme Court four times.203 Some see this as a "glaring ex-
ample of the 'abuse of the appeals process,' ,,4 while others argue
that no safeguard is too much when a defendant's life is at stake.20 5
Considering the United States Supreme Court's recent restriction on
habeas petitions,2 O6 along with the Lucas court's continuing use of
the harmless error doctrine, Harris' execution might have been the
first of many to follow.
Of the twelve cases surveyed, only one was reversed. This is con-
sistent with the Lucas court's tradition of affirming the vast majority
of death penalty cases. Since Lucas became Chief Justice, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has upheld 119 of 148 death penalties, just over
eighty percent.2 07 The Lucas court continues to use its harmless er-
ror policy to uphold the death penalty in cases where errors were in-
consequential to the verdict.
However, the numbers problem still remains. Each year, the court
is unable to decide the number of capital cases appealed; thus, the
backlog continues to grow. The court has failed to devise a method of
review that can simultaneously satisfy the concerns of judicial effi-
ciency and the defendant's due process rights. The only solution
seems to be an expansion of the state judiciary to hear the increasing
number of death penalty appeals. Until then, the court will be forced
to devote significant time and resources to the ever-growing pool of
death penalty cases.
MARco A. COSENTINO
CHAD JEFFERY FISCHER
201. Armstrong, supra note 197 at 1.
202. Id,
203. Id,
204. Id,
205. lM
206. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
207. Phillip Carrizosa, As the Justices Move Right, Death Law Gets Tougher, L.A.
DAILY J., Apr. 16, 1992, at 1.
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III. EDUCATION LAW
The common law of contracts applies to transactions
made pursuant to the Naylor Act: City of Moorpark v.
Moorpark Unified School District.
In City of Moorpark v. Moorpark Unified School District,' the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court rendered its premier interpretation of the
Naylor Act (the Act),2 which governs the sale of certain surplus
school property. The court held that although the Act creates re-
quirements not found in the common law of contracts, it does not
supplant the common law, but merely adds to it. 3 Thus, sales exe-
cuted pursuant to the Naylor Act are governed by common law
principles.4
The Naylor Act was passed in order to make surplus school prop-
erty available to local communities at less than fair market value,
while assuring that local school districts recover at least the cost of
acquiring the property.5 According to the Act, a school district that
wishes to dispose of surplus school property, as described in Califor-
nia Education Code section 39391,6 must first offer to sell or lease the
1. 54 Cal. 3d 921, 819 P.2d 854, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, in which Justices Mosk, Panelli, Ken-
nard, Arabian, Baxter, and George concurred.
The Moorpark School District (the District) notified the City of Moorpark (the City)
of its desire to sell, lease or exchange surplus school property. The City offered the
District an amount equivalent to 25% of the property's fair market value, which is the
minimum price set by the Naylor Act (the Act). The District refused to sell unless the
City agreed to hold hearings to allow for development of an adjacent parcel of land.
After a period of negotiations, the District offered to sell the subject property for its
fair market value. The city refused, claiming that the Act required the District to sell
the subject property at the reduced price.
The trial court issued a writ of mandate, ordering the District to sell the property at
25% of its fair market value. The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the Act, not
common law, governs the sale of surplus school property, and that the District's notice
of its intent to sell, lease, or exchange all or a portion of the site was an offer, under
section 39394 of the California Education Code, which the City accepted, creating a
binding contract.
2. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 39390-39404 (West Supp. 1992).
3. City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 930, 819 P.2d at 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901.
4. Id. at 931, 819 P.2d at 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 902.
5. Id. at 923-24, 819 P.2d at 856, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897. The legislative intent of
the Naylor Act is expressed in California Education Code section 39390, which states:
The Legislature is concerned that school playgrounds, playing fields and
recreational real property will be lost for such uses by the surrounding com-
munities even where those communities in their planning process have as-
sumed that such properties would be permanently available for recreational
purposes. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this article to allow
school districts to recover their investment in such surplus property while
making it possible for other agencies of government to acquire the property
and keep it available for playground, playing field or other outdoor recrea-
tional and open-space purposes.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39390 (West Supp. 1992).
6. California Education Code section 39391 provides:
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land to a variety of public agencies 7 at a price not to exceed the dis-
trict's cost of acquisition.8 Under limited circumstances, however, a
school district may sell a portion of a school site for fair market
value.9 The Act sets the minimum price of the land at twenty-five
percent of its fair market value or an amount related to bond
This article shall apply to any school site owned by a school district, which
the governing board determines to sell or lease, and with respect to which the
following conditions exist:
(a) Either the whole or a portion of the school site consists of land which is
used for school playground, playing field, or other outdoor recreational pur-
poses and open-space land particularly suited for recreational purposes.
(b) The land described in subdivision (a) has been used for one or more of
the purposes specified therein for at least eight years immediately preceding
the date of the governing board's determination to sell or lease the school site.
(c) No other available publicly owned land in the vicinity of the school site
is adequate to) meet the existing and foreseeable needs of the community for
playground, playing field, or other outdoor recreational and open-space pur-
poses, as determined by the governing body of the public agency which pro-
poses to purchase or lease land from the school district, pursuant to Section
39397.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39391 (West Supp 1992).
"Application of the Act does not hinge on a school district's determination that a site
is or is not surplus property. If the criteria of section 39391 are met, the Act applies."
City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 925 n.2, 819 P.2d at 857 n.2, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 898 n.2.
7. California Education Code section 39394 provides, in pertinent part:
[Tihe governing board, prior to selling or leasing any school site containing
land described in Section 39391 .... shall first offer to sell or lease that portion
of the school site consisting of land described in Section 39391 .... to the fol-
lowing public agencies in accordance with the following priorities:
(a) First, to any city within which the land may be situated.
(b) Second, to any park or recreation district within which the land may be
situated.
(c) Third, to any regional park authority having jurisdiction within the area
in which the land is situated.
(d) Fourth, to any county within which the land may be situated.
The governing board shall have discretion to determine whether the offer
shall be an offer to sell or an offer to lease ....
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39394 (West Supp. 1992).
8. City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 924, 819 P.2d at 856, 1 Cal. Rptr 2d at 897. Cali-
fornia Education Code section 39396 states, in pertinent part:
(a) Except its otherwise provided in subdivision (b) or (e), the price at which
land described in Section 39391 . . . is sold pursuant to this article shall not
exceed the school district's cost of acquisition .... In no event shall the price
be less than 25 percent of the fair market value of the land . . . or less than
the amount necessary to retire the share of local bonded indebtedness plus
the amount of the original cost of the approved state aid applications on the
property ....
(b) A school district that offers a portion of a school site for sale may offer
such portion of property for sale at its fair market value, provided the school
district offers an equivalent size alternative portion of that school site for
school playground, playing field, or other recreational and open-space
purposes.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39396 (West Supp. 1992).
9. See CAL. EDUC. CODE 39396 (b) (West Supp. 1992), supra note 8.
1581
indebtedness.l0
The court of appeal concluded that the Act, and not the common
law of contracts, governs sales of surplus school property, and that
the District's notice of its intent to sell the property constituted an
offer under the Act, which the City accepted at the statutorily pro-
scribed price." The supreme court disagreed, seemingly repulsed by
the implication that the Act transformed the District's mere expres-
sion of its desire to sell into a legal offer which empowered the City
to accept and create a contract.12
The supreme court first acknowledged that statutes generally do
not supplant the common law unless it appears that the legislature
intended to occupy the field. 13 While recognizing that the Act pur-
ports to compel school districts to offer surplus school property to
public agencies, the court held that the legislature intended merely
10. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39396 (a) (West Supp. 1992), supra note 8.
11. City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 819 P.2d at 857-58, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 899.
The court of appeal rejected the District's argument that its notice could not be treated
as an offer because of its lack of specificity of price and other information. Instead, the
court concluded that the notice substantially complied with the requirements of the
Act, and because the District did not exempt the site from the Act or retain a portion
of the site pursuant to the Act, the City was free to accept the offer and create a con-
tract. The court also dismissed the District's subsequent attempt to exempt the site
from the Act as "an effort to halt... [the] City's lawsuit and to thwart... [the] City's
acceptance of its offer to sell the property at a surplus price." Id.
12. Id. at 928, 819 P.2d at 858, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900.
"[The Act] does not contemplate, as the Court of Appeal seemed to hold, that
once a district makes a broad proposal to offer to sell, lease, or exchange all or
a portion of a site for fair market value, a responding public agency unilater-
ally may then decide that there shall be a transaction in the form of a sale of a
certain portion of the property for less than fair market value."
Id.
13. Id. at 927, 819 P.2d at 858, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 899 (citing I.E. Assocs. v. Safeco
Title Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 281, 702 P.2d 596, 216 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1985)). See Mark S. Bur-
ton, California Supreme Court Survey, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 555 (1986) (discussing LE. As-
socs.) See also Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977);
Estate of Hering, 108 Cal. App. 3d 88, 166 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1980); Gray v. Sutherland, 124
Cal. App. 2d 280, 268 P.2d 754 (1954); Guardianship of Reynolds, 60 Cal. App. 2d 669,
141 P.2d 498 (1943) Estate of Elizalde, 182 Cal. 427, 188 P. 560 (1920). See generally 15A
AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 18 (1976) ("Tlo effect a change or abrogation by statute
of common-law fundamentals, the legislature's intention must be clearly apparent or
unmistakable. The rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful impli-
cation."); 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 12 (1967 & Supp. 1991) ("The common law is not
to be considered altered, changed, or repealed by statute unless the legislative intent to
do so is plainly or clearly manifested, and any such alteration or repeal will not be con-
sidered effected to a greater extent than the unmistakable import of the language
used."); 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 5 (1980 & Supp. 1991) ("[S]tatutes will not be inter-
preted to alter the common law otherwise than as they may expressly provide; rather,
they are presumed to state the common-law rules absent express declarations to the
contrary, and they should be construed so as to avoid conflict with common-law rules,
if reasonably possible."); 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 761 (3d ed.
1985) (citing cases); 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 50.05 (5th ed. 1992).
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to supplement, not to supplant, the common law of contracts.14
In support of its holding, the supreme court cited various provi-
sions of the Act which grant school districts considerable flexibility
in negotiating contracts for the sale of surplus property. Such a be-
quest of contractual freedom seems to run counter to a legislative in-
tent to "occupy the field," which is the required finding for a
determination that a statute supplants common law.'5
For example, section 39394 gives a district discretion to determine
"whether the offer shall be an offer to sell or an offer to lease."'16
The court aptly noted that, in this case, the District's broad proposal
to offer to sell, lease or exchange the subject property was neither an
offer to sell, nor an offer to lease.17 Additionally, no provision of the
Act dictates whether such a broad proposal is an offer to sell or an
offer to lease. The nature of the offer is left to the discretion of the
school district.18
The court also focused on section 39402, which permits districts to
"enter into other forms of agreement concerning the disposition of
[section 39391] property."'1 9 Section 39402 specifically authorizes a
14. City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 930, 819 P.2d at 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901. The
supreme court disapproved of the court of appeal's piecemeal method of determining
legislative intent. In determining that the Act supplants the common law, the court of
appeal relied on section 39390, supra note 5, which defines the legislative intent, and
section 39394, supra note 7, which compels the district to offer surplus property for
sale to the City once it decides to sell, and the Act's price setting mechanism in section
39396, supra note 8. Id. at 927, 819 P.2d at 858, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 899-900. The supreme
court determined that "[t]he court of appeal improperly focused on the foregoing stat-
utes rather than construing those statutes with reference to the Act as a whole so that
all sections of the Act may be harmonized and given effect." Id at 928, 819 P.2d at 858,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900 (citing Moore v. Panish, 32 Cal. 3d 535, 652 P.2d 32, 186 Cal. Rptr.
475 (1982)).
15. See supra note 13.
16. City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 927, 819 P.2d 858, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900.
17. Id at 928, 819 P.2d at 858, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900. The court reasoned that
"[p]roperly construed, the Act does not mandate a particular type of transaction and
therefore does not by itself render District's statement that it 'proposes to sell, lease or
exchange all or a portion' of the site sufficiently definite to constitute an offer." Id at
929, 819 P.2d at 859, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900. The court also observed that "if [the city]
had indicated that it wished to lease the site, the trial court would have been faced
with the impossible task of divining the length of the lease." Id
18. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39394(d), supra note 7.
19. Section 39402 provides:
A school district... may, as an alternative to sale or lease of the land ...
enter into other forms of agreement concerning the disposition of such prop-
erty with any entity enumerated in Section 39394 .... including, but not lim-
ited to: an agreement to lease.., all or part of the school site for a specified
term, with an option to purchase such properties at the end of the term; an
agreement granting... a permanent open-space easement for recreational use
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district to enter into an agreement requiring a purchaser with zoning
power (such as a city) to rezone any portion of the property that the
district retains.20 Accordingly, if a public entity with zoning power
responded to a district's proposal to sell, lease or exchange a surplus
site, negotiations would likely be necessary to determine the extent
of rezoning.2' Once again, the extent of rezoning is not determined
by the Act, but by negotiations between a district and a public
agency.22 Furthermore, the court briefly noted that the terms of the
Act give the district a limited right to negotiate price in circum-
stances in which the Act allows the district to recover full market
value for the subject property.23
After examining the above provisions, the court reasoned that
"[t]he variety and the nature of the options available to school dis-
tricts implicitly require that districts have the ability, recognized
under the common law of contracts, to make initial, nonbinding over-
tures to various public agencies and to engage in a period of negotia-
tions."24 The court concluded that the flexibility granted to school
districts evinces a legislative intent to merely add requirements to
the common law, not to remove the entire contract process from ap-
plication of common law principles. 25
Accordingly, the District's proposal did not automatically consti-
over a portion of the leased site; and, if the lessee or a grantee under such an
agreement is an entity having zoning powers, an agreement requiring such en-
tity to rezone any portion of the property retained by the school district in ac-
cordance with conditions specified in the agreement.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39402 (West Supp. 1992).
20. See supra note 19.
21. City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 928, 819 P.2d at 859, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900. The
court observed that the instant action was such a case. "The District informed City
that it could not consider disposing of the lower field area unless City held hearings to
allow for development of the entire upper parcel." I& See also Tracy Kaplan, Battle
Over Site of Old High School Mirrors Tensions in Moorpark, L.A. TIMES (Valley ed.),
May 22, 1989, Metro Section, at 6 (stating that the school district requested rezoning of
property for residential or commercial use in order to generate sufficient income to
construct new schools).
22. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
23. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39396 (b), supra note 8. The court stated:
Pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 39396 .... a district may offer a por-
tion of a site at fair market value as long as the district offers an alternative
portion for playground-type use .... The Court of Appeal failed to consider
the possibility that [the] District was attempting to determine whether any
public agency was interested in the property at fair market value as a prelude
to making an offer that would conform to this subdivision.
City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 929, 819 P.2d at 859, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
24. City of Moorpark, 54 Cal. 3d at 928, 819 P.2d at 859, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900 (em-
phasis added).
25. Id. at 930, 819 P.2d at 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901. "In this case, the nature of
the statutory regulation of the contract-making process is such that legislative intent
appears not to be to supplant the common law but to supplement it by adding require-
ments not found in the common law .... But in doing so, it does not purport to re-
move the entire contract process from application of common law principles." Id. at
929-30, 819 P.2d at 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901.
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tute an offer under the Act26 Rather, the court found it necessary to
analyze the District's actions under common law to determine
whether a valid offer had been made. The court quickly and easily
determined that a valid offer had not been made under common law,
hence no contract had been formed.28
Although the Naylor Act is seldom used, at least its proper method
of interpretation the Act is now settled. California school districts do
not relinquish all power to negotiate the disposition of surplus school
property by merely expressing their willingness to make a deal. Ac-
cordingly, a district's broad statement of its willingness to consider
offers does not empower public entities, such as the City of Moor-
park, to compel the sale of such property without any negotiations.
School districts do have common law contract-making rights and
may, within the requirements of the Naylor Act, tailor contracts to
fit their individual needs.
MARco A. COSENTINO
IV. EVIDENCE
The oral formation of a partnership or joint venture need
only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence:
Weiner v. Fleischman.
In Weiner v. Fleischman,' the California Supreme Court held that
the proper standard of proof2 in determining the existence of an oral
26. Id. at 929, 819 P.2d at 859, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900. 'The question of what consti-
tutes an offer is beyond the scope of the Act. The Act does not explicitly define an
offer nor does it implicitly, by the breadth of its regulation, support the conclusion that
the common law of contracts has been supplanted for purposes of determining
whether an offer has been made." Id. at 930, 819 P.2d at 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901.
27. Id. at 930, 819 P.2d at 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901. The flexibility accorded to
school districts in the Act reasonably requires the application of common law
principles.
28. Id. The court first recognized that "[a]n offer is the manifestation of willing-
ness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that
his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it." Id. (citing 1 B. WITIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 128 (9th ed. 1987)). The court then held that
the District's proposal was a mere invitation to others to make offers, and would not
justify an understanding that assent by the recipient of the notice is invited and will
conclude the bargain. Therefore, no valid offer existed under common law. Id
1. 54 Cal. 3d 476, 816 P.2d 892, 286 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1991). Justice Panelli wrote the
opinion for a unanimous court. Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Kennard, Ara-
bian, Baxter and George concurred.
2. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966). The three normal standards of proof
are "beyond a reasonable doubt," by "clear and convincing evidence," and by "a pre-
ponderance of the evidence." In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979), which
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joint venture or partnership is the ordinary civil standard of "prepon-
derance of the evidence." 3 Therefore, a jury instruction that required
"clear and convincing" evidence of an oral joint venture could be con-
sidered reversible error.4
Before addressing the plaintiff's allegations of fraudulent conceal-
ment in a securities transaction, the trial court required proof of a fi-
duciary duty to disclose.5 The plaintiff claimed that this duty arose
out of an oral agreement between the parties to jointly represent a
group of stockholders in finding a third-party buyer or, in the alter-
native, to purchase the stock as a business investment. 6 The trial
court asked the jury to decide this issue in a special verdict.7 The
jury instructions provided that the clear and convincing standard of
proof would govern.8
A preponderance of the evidence is the standard generally used to
determine issues of fact in civil cases. 9 Exceptions are provided by
held that due process requires clear and convincing evidence in commitment proceed-
ings, the United States Supreme Court stated, "The function of a standard of proof...
is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks
[the factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication."'
3. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 490, 816 P.2d at 900, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 48. See generally 7
B. WITIUN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §§ 280-81 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); 1 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Burden of Proof and Presumptions §§ 156-61 (3d ed.
1986 & Supp. 1991); 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence §§ 84-87 (1976); 59 CAL. JUR. 3D Trial
§ 961 (1980).
4. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 491, 816 P.2d at 901, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 49. The test for
reversible error for improper jury instructions revolves around the likelihood that the
jury was misled by the offending instruction. In LeMons v. Regents of California, 21
Cal. 3d 869, 876, 582 P.2d 946, 950, 148 Cal. Rptr. 355, 359 (1978), the court enumerated
five factors used in this reversible error analysis: 1) degree of conflict over critical is-
sue, 2) jury requests for a rereading of the offending instruction or of related evidence,
3) the closeness of the jury verdict, 4) the emphasis placed on the offending instruction
in closing argument and 5) the effect of other attempts to remedy the offending
instruction.
5. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 483, 816 P.2d at 895, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 43. See Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that an employee of a financial printer has
no fiduciary relationship with shareholders of client companies). See generally RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976); 37 AM. JuR. 2D Fraud §§ 145-49
(1968 & Supp. 1991); 34 CAL. JUR. 3D Torts § 24 (1977 & Supp. 1991); 37 C.J.S. Fraud
§§ 15-16 (1943 & Supp. 1991); 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 697
(9th ed. 1988); Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation - Part II, 37
MD. L. REV. 488, 523-27 (1978).
6. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 480, 816 P.2d at 893, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
7. Id. at 481, 816 P.2d at 894, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
8. Id. "Clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability.
Such a test requires that the evidence be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt."
Lillian F. v. Superior Court (Kretz), 160 Cal. App. 3d 314, 320, 206 Cal. Rptr. 603, 606
(1984) (holding that clear and convincing evidence is needed to find lack of capacity to
authorize medical treatment). See generally 31 CAL. JuR. 3D Evidence § 86 (1976 &
Supp. 1991); 1 B. WIMUN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Burden of Proof and Presumptions
§§ 160-62 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1991).
9. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 483, 816 P.2d at 895, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 43. See CAL. EVID.
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either constitutional, statutory or decisional law.10 There is no con-
stitutional exception to this general evidentiary burden of proof in in-
stances where the existence of an oral joint venture or partnership is
in question."1 Statutory exceptions are limited to a few areas of the
law and are tightly circumscribed.12 Therefore, any possible support
for the application of the clear and convincing standard of proof to
oral formation of joint ventures or partnerships must come from de-
cisional law.
The California Supreme Court noted that they "have never held
that the existence of an oral joint venture or partnership agreement
must be established by 'clear and convincing' evidence."13 The court
distinguished the plaintiff's attempt to find support for a contrary
proposition in. any of its previous holdings.14 Turning to the appellate
decisions requiring the clear and convincing standard of proof for an
oral joint venture or partnership, the court traced the various lines of
precedent and found them all fundamentally flawed.15
Surveying other jurisdictions, the court found additional support
for its holding.16 The court further noted that like damage to the
plaintiff could result "from a finding of an oral contract or an oral
authorization of agency," both of which require proof by a preponder-
CODE § 115 (West 1966). See supra note 3 for background material on the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.
10. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 483, 816 P.2d at 896, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 44. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 160 (West 1966).
11. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 483, 816 P.2d at 896, 286 Cal. Rptr, at 44.
12. Id. at 483-84, 488-89, 816 P.2d at 896, 899-900, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 44, 47-48. See
CAL. CirV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1991); CAL. PROB. CODE § 15207 (West 1991).
13. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 484, 816 P.2d at 896, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (emphasis
added).
14. Id at 484-86, 816 P.2d at 896-97, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45. In an attempt to equate
"clear proof" and "clear and convincing evidence, the plaintiff cited Cameron v.
Crocker-Citizens National Bank, 19 Cal. App. 3d 940, 562 P.2d 316, 97 Cal. Rptr. 269
(1971) (holding that the standard of proof for an oral contract to make a will is clear
and convincing evidence) and Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 562 P.2d 316, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 635 (1977) (holding that the standard of proof for fraud is preponderance of the
evidence). The court remained unpersuaded.
15. The court noted that the previous appellate decisions either (i) misconstrued
the language cited as precedent in the seminal case of Welch v. Abbot, 185 Cal. 731,
742, 198 P. 626, 631 (1929), which held that an oral agreement of partnership must be
established by "clear proof," or (ii) miscited case law. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 485-86, 816
P.2d at 897, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
16. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 486-87, 816 P.2d at 898, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 46. Twenty-four
states use a preponderance of the evidence as their standard of proof for an oral joint
venture or partnership: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas and Washington. Five states use the clear and convincing stan-
dard: Alaska, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Tennessee.
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ance of the evidence.17 Finally, the court found no policy reason to
support a higher standard of proof when addressing issues of partner-
ship formation.'8
In spite of any peculiar difficulties which might arise out of an oral
agreement creating a joint venture or partnership agreement, the
court chose not to elevate the standard of proof for this type of agree-
ment above that required for any other oral contract.19 Given the
court's recent holding in Liodas v. Sahadi,20 the court seems intent
on limiting the use of the clear and convincing standard of proof in
civil cases to areas where it has traditionally been recognized.2 '
ARTHUR S. MOREAU III
V. INSURANCE LAW
Construction undertaken for reasons other than to protect
against a risk excluded by an all-risk homeowner's policy
gives rise to coverage under the policy if third party
negligence in executing the project damages the property:
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Von Der Lieth.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Von Der Lieth,' the
California Supreme Court unanimously 2 ruled that dicta from the
court's decision in Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company,3
17. I& at 488, 816 P.2d at 899, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
18. Id. at 487-88, 816 P.2d at 898-99, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 46-47. See Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (holding that a claim of misrepresen-
tation in a securities transaction need only be proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence). In Herman & MacLean, the court stated that the clear and convincing
standard is used "where particularly important individual interests or rights are at
stake" and the preponderance of evidence standard is the fairest standard in that it
allows the parties to "share the risk of error in a roughly equal fashion." Id at 390
(quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
19. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 488, 816 P.2d at 899, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
20. 19 Cal. 3d 278, 286, 562 P.2d 316, 320, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639-40 (1977), (holding
that the proper standard of proof for fraud is preponderance of the evidence).
21. These areas include oral agreements to make wills, claims that property trans-
ferred in a deed absolute is actually a mortgage security interest, and claims that cer-
tain property is subject to trust. Weiner, 54 Cal. 3d at 488-89, 816 P.2d at 899-900, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 47-48. Even fraud, where a conviction can result in onerous damages to
the guilty party, is not one of the "areas of the law in which courts, because of histori-
cal and pervasive legal protection or skepticism, have traditionally required the 'clear
and convincing evidence' burden of proof." Id at 489, 816 P.2d at 900, 286 Cal. Rptr. at
48.
1. 54 Cal. 3d 1123, 820 P.2d 285, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (1991).
2. Chief Justice Lucas wrote the opinion in which Associate Justices Mosk,
Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George concurred.
3. 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989). See generally Mark A.
Clayton, California Supreme Court Survey, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 284 (1989). The facts in
Garvey are analogous to this case. In footnote 7 of its opinion, the Garvey court raised,
but did not decide, whether courts should distinguish between types of third-party neg-
ligence in determining whether a loss is covered. The court stated:
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suggesting recovery under an all-risk homeowner's insurance policy4
might be denied where construction improvements are undertaken
solely for the purpose of protecting against an excluded risk, did not
apply where evidence indicated construction was undertaken for
other reasons.5
This case concerned landslide damage to an insured couple's
home.6 The insureds held an all-risk homeowner's insurance policy7
with State Farm. After filing a claim, they were paid $14,075.71 to
cover the physical damage to their home.8 The insureds, however,
demanded the policy limit of $231,000 on the grounds that the entire
mesa 9 supporting the house required stabilization to remedy the
sliding.10
State Farm filed for declaratory judgment, asking whether earth
movement damage was excluded under the policy. State Farm main-
tained such damage was excluded, and thus they would not be liable
for stabilization costs." The insureds cross-claimed seeking a ruling
that the damage was covered.' 2 At trial the parties advanced several
For example, if construction is undertaken on the insured premises for the
sole purpose of protecting against the operation of a specifically excluded risk
under the homeowner's policy, and that improvement subsequently fails to
serve its purpose because it was negligently designed or constructed, the dam-
age to the structure should arguably not be covered. On the other hand, ordi-
nary negligence that contributes to property loss, but does not involve acts
undertaken to protect against an excluded risk, may give rise to coverage
under an all.risk policy.
Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 408 n.7, 770 P.2d at 712 n.7, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 300 n.7.
State Farm argued that the situation referred to in the Garvey footnote applied to
the Lieth facts, amd that the insurance policy should therefore not cover the third-
party negligence. Lieth, 54 Cal. 3d at 1130-31, 820 P.2d at 1158-59, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
186-87.
4. See generally 17A Am. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 2, 501, 505, 683 (1991) (general
background on all-risk insurance policies); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Property Dam-
age Resulting From Inadequate or Improper Design or Construction of Dwelling as
Within Coverage of "All-Risks" Homeowner's Insurance Policy, 41 A.L.R. 4TH 1095
(1985 & Supp. 1991); Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Coverage Under All Risks Insur-
ance, 88 A.L.R. 2D 1122 (1963 & Supp. 1991).
5. Lieth, 54 Cal. 3d at 1135, 820 P.2d at 293, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191.
6. The insureds lived in the Big Rock Mesa area of Malibu, California. Lieth, 54
Cal. 3d at 1126, 820 P.2d at 287, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185.
7. Id. at 1127, 820 P.2d at 287-88, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185-86.
8. Id.
9. A mesa is a small, high plateau or tableland with steep sides, and is especially
susceptible to landsliding when the groundwater level rises. Gail Diane Cox, On the
Edge; Bad Days at Big Rock- A Search for Legal Fault, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 26, 1987, at 1.
10. Leith, 54 Cal. 3d at 1127, 820 P.2d at 287-88, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185-86.
11. Id.
12. Id. The cross-claim also alleged bad faith, breach of contract, and intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
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causes for the sliding, among them that earth movement was due to
rising groundwater levels and third-party negligence.'8
The trial jury found third-party negligence was the efficient proxi-
mate cause of the sliding, and was covered under the insurance.14
The court of appeal reversed the trial court on the grounds that earth
movement caused by rising ground water was the proximate cause
and was excluded under the policy.15 Alternatively, relying on foot-
note seven of the Garvey opinion, the court reasoned that since the
negligence of the third parties was not distinct from the excluded
risk, the insureds could not recover.'8
The supreme court unanimously reversed the court of appeal on
both grounds.17 The court held that the jury properly found third-
party negligence was the efficient proximate cause and was covered
under the State Farm policy.' 8 The court emphasized that once the
court decides the efficient proximate cause, coverage of the loss is de-
13. I& at 1127-28, 820 P.2d at 288-89, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186-87.
Third-party negligence was attributed to several entities including (1) the State of
California, for removing a supporting "toe" of the mesa in the 1930s to build a section
of the Pacific Coast Highway; (2) the developer, for failing to protect against landslide
activation; (3) the homeowners association, which failed to maintain a pumping system,
and homeowners who failed to maintain their septic tank systems, both of which con-
tributed to the rise in groundwater; and (4) the County, for negligently approving the
project and failing to implement a dewatering plan recommended by the city engineer.
Id.
14. Id. at 1129, 820 P.2d at 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187.
15. Id. Water damage was excluded under the policy, and the court of appeal par-
tially relied upon this in reaching its decision. However, the supreme court deter-
mined that this did not preclude recovery because the policy exclusion contemplated
damage only from natural water below ground, and not the artificially high level of
water precipitated by the development. Id. at 1133, 820 P.2d at 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
190.
16. Id. at 1130, 820 P.2d at 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187-88. See supra note 3 for the
relevant portion of Garvej footnote seven. The supreme court determined that this
broad reading of footnote seven was erroneous. See infra notes 22-24 and accompany-
ing text for the court's reasoning.
17. Lieth, 54 Cal. 3d at 1133, 820 P.2d at 290, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188.
18. Id. at 1135, 820 P.2d at 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189. Causation is generally a
question of fact. Id. at 1131, 820 P.2d at 291, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189; Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d
at 412, 770 P.2d at 714, 257 Cal, Rptr. at 302; 44 Am. JUR. 2D Insurance § 2041 (1982 &
Supp. 1991). However, the judge improperly instructed the jury that an efficient proxi-
mate cause is the "triggering" cause or the one that sets the others in motion, as stated
in Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963). The Garvey
court modified this test for efficient proximate cause, known as the Sabella test, to
mean "predominant" cause, because of the confusion in applying the original Sabella
test in the lower courts. See Mark A. Clayton, California Supreme Court Survey, 17
PEPP. L. REV. 284 (1989); Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeown-
ers Recover from their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J.
783 (1989); Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away II: Will the Effects of Garvey v. State Farm
Slip and Slide?, 21 PAc. L.J. 731 (1990). The supreme court, however, determined that
the erroneous instruction did not prejudice State Farm because the revised test is actu-
ally broader, and it was not reasonably probable that the trial court would have
reached a different result. Lieth, 54 Cal. 3d at 1132-33, 820 P.2d at 291, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 189.
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termined by whether the predominant cause is covered or excluded
by the policy, with coverage being denied where a covered risk is
merely a remote cause.1 9 Since third-party negligence was the proxi-
mate cause and covered under the policy,20 the insureds could re-
cover for the damage caused by the negligence.2'
The court also stated that footnote seven in Garvey, which the
court of appeal used to support its alternative ground, did not apply
to the facts of this case. 22 Unlike the example contained in the foot-
note, the negligent conduct was not undertaken solely to prevent an
excluded occurrence (i.e., earth movement). The negligence was in
planning, approving, and building the Rock Mesa district which was
done to make a profit, provide waste disposal, and produce revenue.23
Thus, even though earth movement, an excluded occurrence, was the
result and the ultimate cause of the damage, third-party negligence
was the predominant cause, and was covered under the policy. The
court cited with approval an appellate and a district court decision to
illustrate its rationale.2 4
The court construed the applicability of the Garvey footnote nar-
rowly. The determining factor was evidence indicating the projects
were undertaken for reasons other than protecting against an ex-
cluded occurrence. Where such a literal approach is taken, policy-
19. Lieth, 54 Cal. 3d at 1131, 820 P.2d at 290-91, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188-89; Garvey, 48
Cal. 3d at 413, 770 P.2d at 715, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 303. See also 39 CAL. JuR. 3D Insurance
Contracts §§ 243-44 (1977 & Supp. 1991); 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Contracts § 700A (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991). All sources cited involve the interpreta-
tion of sections 530 and 532 of the California Insurance Code and the policyholder's
reasonable expectations under the Sabella test.
20. The court reaffirmed Garveiy which stated that in an all-risk homeowner's pol-
icy, the policy covers all risks not specifically excluded. Lieth, 54 Cal. 3d at 1131, 820
P.2d at 290-91, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188-89; Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 408, 770 P.2d at 711-12,
257 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. Since third-party negligence is a "risk of physical loss," and
the policy did not exclude risk of physical loss, third-party negligence was a covered
occurrence. Id.
21. The court remanded to the court of appeal the issue of whether State Farm
owed an obligation to pay for stabilization costs. Lieth, 54 Cal. 3d at 1135, 820 P.2d at
293, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191.
22. Id. at 1134, 820 P.2d at 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190. See supra note 3 for the
pertinent text of footnote seven.
23. Leith, 54 Cal. 3d at 1135, 820 P.2d at 293, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191.
24. Id. Davis v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1322, 273 Cal. Rptr.
224 (1990) (holding that insurance policy covered property loss caused by excluded risk
of house settling due to construction negligence in failing to properly prepare soil be-
cause grading and foundation were other reasons for construction); Winans v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that negligent
construction resulting in earth settlement is a separate occurrence and not subject to
"earth movement" exclusion under all-risk homeowner's policy).
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holders can easily cite reasons other than protection of the excluded
coverage for undertaking such projects. It remains to be seen
whether the court will subject such reasons to stricter scrutiny.
Still, insurers may arguably deny coverage where improvements
are undertaken with the sole intent of protecting against an excluded
loss. The court did not retract the sentiments that the Garvey court
expressed in footnote seven. However, such a case has not yet arisen.
As a result of Lieth, insurance premiums for homeowner's prop-
erty insurance may increase once insurers realize their increased lia-
bility.25 Insurance industry attorneys anticipate an increase in
related lawsuits.26 Insurers may also implement clauses excluding
this type of coverage-where huge but relatively unexpected liability
can result.
Lieth clarified the law where property damage insurance coverage
depends on a number of dependent causes, some included and some
excluded under a policy. It also indicated that if footnote seven of
the Garvey opinion is to be applied at all, it must be applied to the
specific situation in which work is undertaken solely to protect
against an excluded risk. At least insurers can now spare themselves
the litigation costs of trying to broaden applicability of the Garvey
footnote.
ADAM L. JOHNSON
VI. LABOR LAW
Section 4656 of the Labor Code does not authorize an
award of compensation for renewed temporary total
disability more than five years after the original injury:
Nickelsberg v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Nickelsberg v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,' the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the amend-
ment to section 4656 of the California Labor Code2 (hereinafter all
statutory references are to the California Labor Code unless other-
wise indicated) authorized a workers' compensation judges to make
25. Philip Hager, Liability in Negligence Cases Widened, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1991, at D3.
26. Id.
1. 54 Cal. 3d 288, 814 P.2d 1328, 285 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1991). Justice Panelli wrote the
majority opinion with Justices Lucas, Arabian and Baxter concurring. Justice Brous-
sard wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which Justices Mosk and Kennard joined.
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4656 (West 1989). See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text
for the provisions of section 4656 before and after the amendment.
3. For an overview of Workers' Compensation Law in California, see generally 2
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation §§ 1, 16,18 (9th ed.
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an award for renewed temporary total disability4 which occurred
more than five years after a job-related injury.5 The court concluded
that the amendment to section 4656 does not confer such authority
upon a workers' compensation judge.6
In 1977, section 4656 provided that compensation for a temporary
partial or total disability could not continue for "more than 240 com-
pensable weeks within a period of five years from the date of the in-
jury." 7 In 1978, section 4656 was amended.8 The amended section
stated that compensation for temporary partial disability could not
exceed "240 compensable weeks within a period of five years ....
However, amended section 4656 did not provide any time limitation
regarding compensation for a temporary total disability for injuries
occurring after January 1, 1979.10 Existing sections 5804 and 5410
each provided that an award by a workers' compensation judge could
not be altered beyond a five-year period." Therefore, following the
amendment of section 4656, it was unclear whether a workers' com-
pensation judge could make an additional award for renewed tempo-
rary total disability which occurs more than five years after the
original job-related injury.'2
In Nickelsberg, Dieter Nickelsberg incurred back and leg injuries
in 1976 and 1979 while employed as a truck driver for the Los Ange-
les Unified School District. Nickelsberg was temporarily totally dis-
abled from January 6, 1979 through June 8, 1981 and was classified as
being approximately sixty-six percent permanently disabled. A
1987 & Supp. 1991); 65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation §§ 1, 21 (1981 & Supp.
1991). See also Richard A. Bancroft, Some Procedural Aspects of the California Work-
men's Compensation Law, 40 CAL. L. REV. 378 (1952) (discussing the history of work-
ers' compensation and the authority and jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board).
4. For a discussion of the classification of a disability, see generally 2 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation §§ 263, 270-273 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1991) and 65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation §§ 129-131 (1981).
5. Nickelsberg, 54 Cal. 3d at 291, 814 P.2d at 1330, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 292, 814 P.2d at 1330-31, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 88-89. See 1959 Cal. Stat. 3279,
ch. 1189, § 12.
8. Nickesberg, 54 Cal. 3d at 292, 814 P.2d at 1331, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 89. See 1978
Cal. Stat. 2913, ch. 937, § 1.
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4656 (West 1989).
10. Id. For a discussion of the length of payments for temporary disability, see
generally 2 B. WITKIN, Summary of California LAW, Workers' Compensation § 435
(1987); 65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 145 (1981); 82 AM. JUR. 2D Work-
men's Compensation § 382 (1981 & Supp. 1991).
11. See infra notes 22-23 for statutory text.
12. Nickelsberg, 54 Cal. 3d at 291, 814 P.2d at 1330, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
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workers' compensation judge ordered the school district to indemnify
Nickelsberg for (1) the period of time he was temporarily totally dis-
abled (2) for his permanent disability, and (3) for future medical ex-
penses related to the injury.'3
In July 1987, Nickelsberg underwent back surgery which was re-
lated to his previous job-related injury. As a result of the former
workers' compensation decision, the school district paid Nickelsberg's
medical expenses. However, the school district did not compensate
Nickelsberg for the temporary total disability which he suffered as a
result of the back surgery. On February 8, 1988, Nickelsberg filed
this workers' compensation action seeking an alteration of his former
award which would indemnify Nickelsberg for the period during
which he was temporarily totally disabled.'4 A workers' compensa-
tion judge granted the award and the school district appealed to the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board15 (WCAB). The WCAB re-
versed, finding that the workers' compensation judge did not have ju-
risdiction to make the award.16 The court of appeal affirmed.17
Granting review, the supreme court held that section 4656 does not
authorize the award of compensation for renewed temporary total
disability occurring more than five years after the original injury.'8
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by differentiating
between an award for medical expenses and an award for temporary
disability. The court noted that medical expenses are awarded to fa-
cilitate the recovery of a worker, while an award for temporary disa-
bility serves to compensate a worker for lost income.19 Thus, the
court stated that an award of medical expenses would not necessarily
result in an award for temporary total disability which resulted from
the medical services.20
The supreme court then interpreted the legislature's intent in
amending section 4656. The court stated that the purpose of the
amendment is to allow workers who suffer a temporary total disabil-
ity to receive payments for as long as they are continuously dis-
13. Id. at 291, 814 P.2d at 1330, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
14. Id. at 292, 814 P.2d at 1330, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 300-01, 814 P.2d at 1336, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
19. Id. at 293-94, 814 P.2d at 1331-32, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90. See generally 2 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation §§ 249-50, 252 (9th ed.
1987) (discussing the purpose of an award and types of awards).
20. Nickelsberg, 54 Cal. 3d at 294, 814 P.2d at 1332, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
1594
[Vol. 19: 1545, 1992] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
abled.21 Moreover, the court noted that sections 580422 and 541023
each place a five-year restriction on the ability of a worker to alter
his workers' compensation award.24 Further, the court suggested
that in order to facilitate an employer's ability to obtain workers'
compensation insurance,25 there must be a time when an award from
a worker's compensation judge becomes final.26 Therefore, the court
concluded that section 4656 does not authorize an award of compen-
sation for renewed temporary total disability occurring more than
five years after the original injury.27
B. Minority Opinion
Justice Broussard wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Contrary to
the majority, Justice Broussard contended that the purpose for
amending section 4656 was to authorize compensation for renewed
temporary total disability occurring more than five years after an in-
jury.28 In addition, Broussard argued that an award of future medical
expenses impliedly carries with it an award of future temporary total
disability costs associated with the treatment.29 Therefore, Broussard
concluded that the workers' compensation judge had the authority to
award temporary total disability compensation beyond a five-year
period.30
III. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court held that the amendment of section
21. Id. at 295-96, 814 P.2d at 1333, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (citations omitted).
22. Section 5804 states in pertinent part: "No award of compensation shall be re-
scinded, altered, or amended ifter five years from the date of the injury ... CAL
LAB. CODE § 5804 (West 1989) (emphasis added).
23. Section 5410 states in pertinent part: "Nothing in this chapter shall bar the
right of any injured worker to institute proceedings for the collection of compensation
... within five years after the date of the injury .... " CAL. LAB. CODE § 5410 (West
Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
24. Nickelsberg, 54 Cal. 3d at 298, 814 P.2d at 1334, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
25. See generully 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compen-
sation §§ 134-35 (9th ed. 1987) (discussing insurance for workers' compensation).
26. Nickelsberg, 54 Cal. 3d at 299, 814 P.2d at 1335, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
27. Id. at 301, 814 P.2d at 1336, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 94. In addition, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiff did not file a timely claim under section 5804 to alter his previ-
ous award or under section 5410 for a "new and further disability." Id. at 300-02, 814
P.2d at 1336-37, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95.
28. Id at 303, 814 P.2d at 1338, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (citations omitted) (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 304, 814 P.2d at 1339, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 97 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 302, 814 P.2d at 1337, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
1595
4656 does not authorize a workers' compensation judge to award com-
pensation for renewed temporary total disability occurring more than
five years after an injury.3 1 Although it appears that very few work-
ers will be faced with a situation similar to that of the plaintiff in this
case,32 those few workers that suffer renewed temporary total disa-
bility may incur a substantial loss of income. As a result, it is impor-
tant to note that a party who suffers renewed temporary total
disability, resulting from medical treatment for an injury which oc-
curred more than five years previous, may still be able to recover
under two theories. First, a worker may contend that the medical
treatment constitutes a new injury.33 Second, where a workers' com-
pensation judge reserves jurisdiction to award temporary total disa-
bility compensation beyond five years, an award is arguably proper.34
However, until these two potential avenues of recovery are ruled
upon by the courts, recovery by workers which encounter renewed
temporary total disability beyond a five-year period is uncertain.
RICHARD JOHN BERGSTROM III
VII. TAXATION
Supermajority voting limitations on the imposition of
taxes established by Proposition 13 apply to agencies
created without the power to impose property taxes: Rider
v. County of San Diego.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rider v. County of San Diego' the supreme court further inter-
preted Proposition 13, namely the issues remaining from the case of
Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmond2 and
the validity of a taxation scheme enacted to circumvent the
supermajority two-thirds voter approval requirement for special
taxes imposed by special districts.3 In Rider, a legislatively created
31. Id. at 300-01, 814 P.2d at 1336, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
32. Id. at 296, 814 P.2d at 1333, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 292 n.2, 814 P.2d at 1330 n.2, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 88 n.2. See Rodgers v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 567, 571-72, 214 Cal. Rptr. 303,
306 (1985) (holding that an injury to an employee in the course of treatment was a new
compensable injury).
34. Nickelsberg, 54 Cal. 3d at 299 n.8, 814 P.2d at 1335 n.8, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 93 n.8.
1. 1 Cal. 4th 1, 820 P.2d 1000, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas au-
thored the majority opinion, joined by Justices Arabian, Baxter, and George. Justice
George also wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Panelli joined. Justice Ken-
nard joined in Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion, but did not express a view on the pro-
spective application of the majority's holding.
2. 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982).
3. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 5, 820 P.2d at 1002, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492; see Richmond, 31
Cal. 3d at 208, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
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Agency4 was found to be a "special district" under section 45 of Prop-
osition 13 even though it lacked the authority to levy a tax on real
property.6 Additionally, the sales tax at issue was construed to con-
stitute a "special tax" due to the highly specific function to which the
Agency would direct the revenues.7
San Diego County needed to upgrade its justice facilities. In 1986,
however, the county failed to secure the voters' two-thirds approval
of a proposed sales tax for such facilities section 4 of Proposition 13
required. In the alternative, the state legislature created a "limited
purpose special district" charged with adopting a tax ordinance which
would impose a supplemental one-half sales tax increase upon simple
majority approval of the county's voters. County taxpayers filed suit
challenging the Agency's sales tax.8 The trial court concluded the
tax was unconstitutional as a "deliberate and unavailing attempt to
circumvent section 4."9 Under the pretext of being bound to Rich-
mond, however, the court of appeal reversed, finding section 4 inap-
plicable to the Agency because the Agency lacked power to levy a
property tax.10 The supreme court affirmed the court of appeal, find-
ing the tax unconstitutional because it failed to acquire supermajority
voter approval."
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
A. Majority Opinion
1. Special District
In Richmond, a sales tax was imposed by the Los Angeles County
4. The name of the agency was the San Diego County Regional Justice Facility
Financing Agency, which the state legislature created by enacting Government Code
sections 26250-26285. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26250-26285 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
5. Proposition 13 was the 1978 initiative measure through which the voters en-
acted section 4 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, which provides:
Cities, Counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified elec-
tors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad
valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of
real property within such City, County or special district.
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4. 9 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Taxation § 109 (9th
ed. 1989 & Supp. 1.991) (voting procedures).
6. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 9, 820 P.2d at 1005, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495. See infra notes
12-22 and accompanying text for the court's reasoning.
7. Id. at 14, 820 P.2d at 1008, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498. See infra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text for the court's reasoning.
8. Id. at 9, 820 P.2d at 1004-05, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494-95.
9. Id. at 6, 820 P.2d at 1002, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492.
10. Id. at 6, 820 P.2d at 1003, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
11. Id. at 14, 820 P.2d at 1009, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499.
1597
Transportation Commission (LACTC), an agency created in 1976
prior to the adoption of Proposition 13.12 The supreme court in Rich-
mond focused on the issue of whether the LACTC was a "special dis-
trict" under section 4.13 Because the agency was formed prior to the
passage of Proposition 13 and lacked the power to impose a tax on
real property, the court refused to consider the agency a special
district.14
In the present case, the court of appeal's decision would expand the
Richmond rule to the point of giving any local district or agency that
lacked power to impose property taxes the ability to implement other
tax measures, even if the district or agency was created for the exclu-
sive purpose of circumventing section 4.15 However, the supreme
court found that such a result would be contrary to the intention of
the framers of and voters for Proposition 13.16 The policy that un-
dergirds section 4, restricting the ability of local governments to im-
pose new taxes to replace property tax revenues, would be frustrated
if cities and counties could create taxing districts to finance local obli-
gations without acquiring supermajority approval from the voters.17
Thus, the court ruled that the term "special district" includes "any
local taxing agency created to raise funds . .. to replace revenues
lost" by Proposition 13.18
The supreme court introduced an "essential control" test to inden-
tify purposeful circumvention of Proposition 13.19 This test is
designed to determine whether a new taxing agency is formed to re-
12. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 199, 643 P.2d at 942, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
13. Id. at 208, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
14. After examining the voters' pamphlet, the Richmond court determined that
Proposition 13 was aimed at property tax relief, and that section 4 of Proposition 13
was intended to restrict the ability of local governments to impose new taxes to re-
place property tax revenues lost under that measure. Id. at 206, 643 P.2d at 946, 182
Cal. Rptr. at 329. See Ballot Pamp. Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with Arguments
to Voters, Primary Elec. at 56 (June 6, 1978).
15. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 10, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
16. Id.
17. Id. See Rodney T. Smith, Constitutional Reform Gone Awry: The Apportion-
ment of Property Taxes in California ofter Proposition 13, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 829
(1990).
18. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 11, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
19. Id. at 11-12, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. The majority stated that
courts may "infer" an agency's intent to circumvent the supermajority requirement
when the new agency is "essentially controlled" by one or more city or county. This
determination may rest upon several factors,
including the presence or absence of (1) substantial municipal control over
agency operations, revenues or expenditures, (2) municipal ownership or con-
trol over agency property or facilities, (3) coterminous physical boundaries, (4)
common or overlapping governing boards, (5) municipal involvement in the
creation or formation of the agency, and (6) agency performance of functions
customarily or historically perfomed by municipalities and financed through
levies of property taxes.
Id.
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place revenues lost by Proposition 13 and whether the agency is con-
trolled by a city or county which otherwise need comply with the
supermajority provisions of section 4.20 Because the Agency was cre-
ated with its geographic boundaries coterminous with those of the
county and with its purpose to levy a sales tax on a mere majority of
voter approval, 21 the court found purposeful circumvention of section
4, and hence, the Agency qualified as a special district under that
section.22
2. Special Tax
Section 4 limits the special district's taxing power only with regard
to "special taxes."23 Special taxes under section 4 are "taxes levied
for a specific purpose rather than . . . a levy placed in the general
fund to be utilized for general governmental purposes."24  The
Agency claimed their tax was a general tax because it was directed to
"the general governmental purposes of the agency."25 According to
the supreme court, however, the Agency's tax was a special tax be-
cause the sales tax was specifically earmarked for the construction of
justice facilities to the exclusion of any claimed general purposes.2 6
Thus, section 4 controlled, thereby requiring, the sales tax to surpass
the supermajority voter requirement.
B. Concurring Opinion
Although the majority disposed of the plaintiffs' claim on constitu-
tional grounds, in his concurrence Justice George argued for a resolu-
tion based upon a statutory construction.27 Under the auspices of
judicial restraint,2 8 George proposed that the statutory provisions of
20. Id,
21. Id, at 12, 820 P.2d at 1005, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495. The county created the
Agency because the tax did not achieve the required two-thirds voter approval. More-
over, the court noted that initially the entire County board of supervisors was to serve
as the Agency's board of directors until the Legislative Counsel advised against such a
nexus. '"The fird version included only two county supervisors among the seven
Agency directors." Id. at 9, 820 P.2d at 1005, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495.
22. Id. at 13, 820 P.2d at 1006, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
23. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4. See supra note 5 for constitutional text.
24. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 14, 820 P.2d at 1008, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498 (quoting County of
San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 57, 648 P.2d 935, 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718
(1982)).
25. Id., 1 Cal. 4th at 13, 820 P.2d at 1007-08, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497-98.
26. Id. at 14, 820 P.2d at 1008, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.
27. Id. at 16, 820 P.2d at 1010, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500 (George, J., concurring).
28. Id (George, J., concurring). See Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
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Proposition 62 led to a more straightforward solution than those of
Proposition 13.29 Unlike Proposition 13 which is narrowly applied to
the actions of cities, counties and "special districts," Proposition 62
applies to all "local government[s] or district[s]" which have been de-
fined to include "an agency of the state."30 Justice George, moreover,
found plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition 62
untenable. It would be incongruous, he asserted, to prevent the legis-
lature from making the local entity's taxing authority contingent on
prior voter approval of the tax.31 Thus, Proposition 62 is constitu-
tionally sound and the sales tax at issue in this case is invalid under a
proper statutory analysis.32
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk attacked the majority for
what he viewed to be a departure from stare decisis.33 The Rich-
mond court decisively held that "special districts," as used in section
4, refers exclusively to districts which have the power to levy a prop-
erty tax.3 4 Justice Mosk argued that the Agency, here, is not a "spe-
cial district" within the parameters of section 4 because it does not
have the power to levy a property tax.3 5 Moreover, Justice Mosk
noted that California voters rejected Proposition 36, which contained
an interpretation of section 4 requiring any measure increasing taxes
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory con-
struction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter."); Palermo v. Stockton
Theaters 32 Cal. 2d 53, 66, 195 P.2d 1, 9 (1948) ("It is a well-established principle that
this court will not decide consitutional questions where other grounds are available
and dispositive of the issues of the case.").
29. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 18, 820 P.2d at 1010, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501 (George, J.,
concurring).
30. Id. (George, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 24, 820 P.2d at 1015, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490 (George, J., concurring). This
is in contrast to the reasoning found in Geiger v. Board of Supervisors where the court
held that any statute requiring voter approval of a local tax is unconstitutional. Geiger
v. Board of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 2d 836, 313 P.2d 545 (1957). "Any holding that such
[sales tax] measures are subject to referendum would be contrary to [the inability of
the Legislature to expand the referendum power beyond the scope of the power re-
served by the Constitution]." Id. at 836-37, 313 P.2d at 547. Justice George believed the
Geiger court's respect for the viability of local tax measures and the counties' need for
freedom from continual tax challenges from a small percentage of the electorate was
not applicable to a voter-approval requirement preconditioning a local government's
authority to levy such a tax. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 23, 820 P.2d at 1014, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
504 (George, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 24, 820 P.2d at 1015, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505 (George, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 25, 820 P.2d at 1016, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
34. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
35. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 26-27, 820 P.2d at 1016, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506-07 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, Justice Mosk pointed to the language in section 4 which recog-
nizes that special districts may impose special or general taxes, and took issue with the
majority opinion which, he believes, renders "special" all taxes levied by a special dis-
trict. Id. at 30, 820 P.2d at 1019, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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on the taxpayers to achieve supermajority approval; Justice Mosk
claimed passage of Proposition 36 would have effected the same re-
sult that the majority opinion now advances.36 Additionally, Justice
Mosk found the majority's "essential control" test "unworkable"3 7
and the consequences to approximately five thousand nonschool spe-
cial districts in California to be untoward.3 8 Finally, Justice Mosk ad-
vised the majority that in the interests of fairness their holding
should apply prospectively only.3 9
III. CONCLUSION
Rider v. County of San Diego stands for the proposition that even
if a local government pushes the necessary buttons to circumvent the
36. Id. at 28, 820 P.2d at 1018, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Proposi-
tion 36 would have repealed and reenacted section 4 in order to close loopholes in the
law and require supermajority approval of any measure which effected higher taxes.
Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. at
44 (Nov. 6, 1984).
37. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 28-29, 820 P.2d at 1018, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508-9 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Mosk took issue with the majority's criteria for locating pur-
poseful circumvention. "[O]verlapping governing boards" is an example which Justice
Mosk found applicable to 40% of the more than approximately 5000 nonschool special
districts which share governing boards with the board of supervisors or city councils.
Moreover, agencies often hold the same geographic boundaries as counties, as is the
case with most water districts. Id. at 29, 820 P.2d at 1018, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 508 (Mosk,
J., dissenting). See Cal. Controller, Ann. Rep. of Fin. Transactions Concerning Special
Districts of Cal. at 1-9 (1988-89).
38. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 31-33, 820 P.2d at 1020, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510-11 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). The extent to which this holding will jeopardize all taxing agencies cre-
ated since 1978 "cannot be known, but it is safe to say that the financial stability of all
districts created since 1978 will be severely damaged." Id. at 32, 820 P.2d at 1020, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 510 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 34, 820 P.2d at 1021, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 511 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk reluctantly felt the need to advise the majority that it could refuse to give retro-
active effect to a decision when considerations of fairness justify prospective operation,
and laments that their silence on "this crucial issue is ominous." Id. (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). See Forster Shipbldg. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450, 353 P.2d 736, 6
Cal. Rptr. 24 (1960); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439
(1991) (plurality opinion) (holding that if a new rule is applied to the prevailing party,
it must be applied retroactively to all other applicants). But see id. at 2451 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (arguing, along with Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy, that the Court
frequently denied retroactivity in the interests of fairness). Because the Rider holding
applies retroactively and contradicts the Richmond holding on which the "[legislature,
local entities, bondholders, taxpayers, contractors and others have relied" for almost
ten years, Justice Mosk fears for the very existence of numerous local taxing entities
that are essential to government functioning yet were adopted by less than a
supermajority vote. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 31-32, 820 P.2d at 1020, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk asserted that the majority's holding in Rider
threatens billions of dollars in obligations created on the premise that Richmond was
controlling law. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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voting requirements of section 4, the intentions of the framers of and
voters for Proposition 13 will not be thwarted. Although the compe-
tence of the majority's "essential control" test to expose purposeful
circumvention of section 4 will be determined in what Justice Mosk
fears will be a concomitant flood of litigation, the majority took pains
to ensure that the test hinges on reasonable findings of fact and not
bright-line and draconian conclusions.
The court's departure from Richmond-applying section 4 to not
only those districts that operate to replace revenues lost in property
taxes, but to districts that operate to replace all revenues lost to
Proposition 13--erects a formidable hurdle to local government's
ability to raise revenues.40 Ultimately, the effects of this holding will
be wrestled out in courtrooms, ensuring further scrutiny into the
questionable constitutional nature of Proposition 13.41
DEAN THOMAS TRIGGS
40. See, e.g., Joseph T. Henke & Miles A. Woodlief, The Fffect of Proposition 13
Court Decisions on California Local Government Revenues, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 251
(1988).
41. The majority and dissent both recognize the "fundamentally undemocratic"
nature of supermajority voter requirements. See Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 7, 820 P.2d at
1003, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493 (citing Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 328); see also id. at 27, 820 P.2d at 1017, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507.
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